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The reluctance of antitrust to condemn parallel exclusion 
permits oligopolies to be entrenched. This is because parallel 
exclusion—multiple-firm conduct that inhibits market 
entrants—cannot satisfy the current strictures on 
monopolization, which are understood to prohibit single-firm 
conduct. Yet this is an outdated way of conceptualizing 
monopolization. An expansion of monopolization—to cover 
parallel, non-collusive acts by an oligopoly—is due. 
To push the law toward recognizing parallel exclusion, 
this Article examines concentration in the markets for 
financial derivatives, which are perennially dominated by the 
same big banks. Even after losses under first-generation 
antitrust claims, the dominant derivatives dealers have found 
ways to retain market power. This Article therefore delves 
into the market power dynamics that traditional theories 
have sidestepped. 
As a technical exercise, this Article illustrates the 
relevance of market definition as a paradigm—particularly 
for illuminating blind spots in financial regulation. As a 
doctrinal endeavor, this Article buttresses the efforts of other 
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scholars to frame parallel exclusion as a form of 
monopolization. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine if the country’s four largest airlines controlled 
the primary airport serving Los Angeles (“LAX”).1 Such an 
arrangement likely strikes us as unseemly, though the 
degree of our discomfort might depend on several factors.2 
Antitrust categorizes the potential harms of this 
arrangement,3 while devising a schema for when to 
intervene. For instance, collusion among the large airlines to 
shut out their competitors would violate Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act,4 while the purchase of LAX by the world’s 
largest airline may run afoul of Section 2.5 
However, if the four large airlines merely sat on a 
committee that oversaw LAX’s safety standards and 
advocated for blocking rival airlines on safety grounds, an 
antitrust violation would be much harder to establish—even 
if, year after year, the same four airlines dominated 
commercial flights serving the airport. Without explicit 
agreement or single-firm conduct, current antitrust doctrine 
provides little recourse. 
Such is the quandary of parallel exclusion: “conduct, 
engaged in by multiple firms, that blocks or slows would-be 
market entrants.”6 Despite robust evidence of 
 
1 On the collision of cultures borne of LAX’s (in)famous congestion, see 
generally Pico Iyer, Where Worlds Collide: In Los Angeles International 
Airport, the Future Touches Down, HARPER’S MAG., Aug. 1995, at 50. 
2 E.g., how much of the market do the four airlines control; how much 
of the city’s traffic runs through LAX; and how exactly do the airlines 
“control” LAX? 
3 E.g., leveraging, foreclosure, and exclusion. See Patrick Rey & Jean 
Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in 3  HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORG. 2145 
(Mark Armstrong & Rob Porter eds., 2007); Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion 
as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 527 n.1 (2012). 
4 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
5 Id. § 2. This is especially true if the purchasing airline commands 
the vast majority of its relevant market. 
6 C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 
1182, 1185 (2013). 
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anticompetitive, self-entrenching conduct by oligopolies,7 the 
law remains stagnant.8 This Article attempts to move the 
law by showing that parallel exclusion suppresses 
competition in the financial derivatives markets, causing 
harms consistent with monopolization.9 
While the air traffic illustration above is hypothetical, 
two gargantuan financial services markets are converging 
similarly today. In the derivatives trading market, 
derivatives instruments are bought and sold.10 In the 
derivatives clearing market, financial intermediaries known 
as clearinghouses process derivatives trades.11 
Clearinghouses perform “back office” functions, such as 
clearing, settling, and guaranteeing trades.12 Since 2010, 
financial reform laws have required most derivatives trades 
to run through these intermediaries.13 Characterized by 
strong economies of scale, clearinghouses are natural 
 
7 See id. at 1191–95, 1202–04 (analyzing parallel exclusion in the 
credit card, piping, shipping, and tobacco industries, among others). 
8 See infra Section II.A. 
9 Derivatives are financial instruments whose values fluctuate on the 
basis of other variables, such as interest rates, stock prices, and whether 
an unaffiliated party might default on a loan. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., 
The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: 
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 
337–73 (2002). 
10 See Bank for Int’l Settlements, Derivatives Statistics, BIS Q. REV., 
Sept. 2014, tbl.19, http://www.bis.org/statistics/dt1920a.pdf [http:/ /perma.
cc/877H-SL8C?type=pdf] (quantifying the notional size of the OTC 
derivatives market at $710 trillion as of December 2013). 
11 See John McPartland, Clearing and Settlement Demystified, CHI. 
FED LETTER, no. 201, Jan. 2005, at 1. 
12 Id. See also infra Section III.A.1. 
13 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 723, 763, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675–82, 1762–84 (2010) 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3); Parliament and Council 
Regulation 648/2012, On OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and 
Trade Repositories, art. 4, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 17–18 (EU). 
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monopolies that financial regulations have rendered 
indispensable to trading.14 
Yet clearinghouses are also member-driven entities, 
whose members are also the dominant players in the 
adjacent trading (or dealer) market.15 Invariably, these 
dominant dealers are the largest financial institutions in the 
world.16 In the post-financial crisis derivatives landscape, 
clearinghouses function as bottlenecks through which 
adjacent markets’ activities must pass. 
Derivatives markets serve as a compelling example of 
parallel exclusion and its harms for several reasons. First, 
the same four or five players perpetually capture these 
markets, especially for over-the-counter (“OTC”) 
derivatives.17 These players preserve the oligopoly despite 
market and regulatory changes. For instance, after financial 
reform laws mandated centralized clearing for credit default 
swaps, the top dealers conspired to funnel trades into the 
clearinghouse that they controlled while denying rivals 
access to the same clearinghouse.18 Even after settling a 
class action for, among other claims, collusion and 
monopolization,19 these dealers have not surrendered market 
 
14 See Felix B. Chang, Financial Market Bottlenecks and the 
“Openness” Mandate, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 70–72 (2015). 
15 Id. at 84–87. 
16 See infra Section III.B. 
17 Derivatives can be divided into exchange-traded and over-the-
counter: the first category is traded on open markets, such as futures and 
options exchanges; the second category is customized between the parties 
to a trade. See Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 731–36 (2002); Henry T.C. Hu, 
Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the 
Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1464–65 (1993) 
(focusing on the OTC markets). 
18 See In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476, 
2014 WL 4379112, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014). 
19 Katy Burne, Big Banks Agree to Settle Swaps Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 12, 2015, 2:40 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-wall-street-
groups-agree-to-settle-credit-swaps-antitrust-case-1441988741 
[https://perma.cc/4LHH-Z5TQ]. Interestingly, the monopolization claim 
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share.20 Therefore, the traditional antitrust frameworks of 
collusion and monopolization have proven insufficient to 
deter the oligopoly. 
Second, parallel exclusion has spurred the clearing and 
dealer markets to coalesce in a manner that replicates the 
anticompetitive effects of monopolization. Critics of the link 
between clearinghouses and dealers point to harms such as 
foreclosure and leveraging,21 whereby a monopolist’s control 
of a bottleneck facility enables the monopolist to exclude 
rivals from the more lucrative downstream market.22 
Traditionally, foreclosure and leveraging were seen as 
monopolization offenses.23 Yet, tradition also says that 
monopolization can only be attributed to one dominant 
firm.24 In their seminal article Parallel Exclusion, Professors 
Scott Hemphill and Tim Wu propose a “shared monopoly” 
theory, whereby Section 2 of the Sherman Act is stretched to 
encompass monopolization by multiple firms.25 The 
mechanisms of exclusion in the derivatives markets validate 
 
could not move past the motion to dismiss. See In re Credit Default Swaps, 
2014 WL 4379112, at *16. 
20 See infra Section II.B. 
21 E.g., Michael Greenberger, Diversifying Clearinghouse Ownership 
in Order to Safeguard Free and Open Access to the Derivatives Clearing 
Market, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 245 (2013); Wallace C. Turbeville, 




22 See CFTC & SEC, Public Roundtable on Governance and Conflicts 
of Interest in the Clearing and Listing of Swaps 32–33, Washington, D.C., 
Aug. 20, 2010 [hereinafter CFTC Roundtable] (statement of Randy 
Kroszner, Professor of Economics, University of Chicago, Booth School of 
Business). 
23 See Baker, supra note 3, at 533 (noting that exclusionary claims are 
most commonly framed as challenges to vertical agreements or 
monopolization). 
24 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1187. 
25 See id. at 1236–40. 
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this proposal to house parallel exclusion within 
monopolization. 
Third, certain types of parallel exclusion are harmful for 
reasons beyond antitrust. Parallel exclusion in derivatives 
markets shuts out rivals and injures consumers.26 Yet, it also 
perpetuates concentration among the major dealers, and 
concentration is a surefire conduit of systemic risk.27 
Combatting the dominance of incumbent dealers underpins 
much of the corporate and financial regulation of 
clearinghouses.28 In fact, breaking up dealer dominance has 
been an implicit goal of the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission’s rules on derivatives clearing organizations.29 
So far, though, regulatory efforts have failed in this 
respect.30 
All in all, parallel exclusion in derivatives markets is 
likely to constitute a pernicious kind of exclusion—more 
anticompetitive than efficient, and altogether risky for the 
 
26 See infra Part IV. 
27 See Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CAL. L. REV. 
1641, 1677–78 (2013). 
28 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TREAS-DO-2007-0018, REVIEW OF 
THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE ASSOCIATED WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 
COMMENTS BEFORE THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/comments-united-states-department-justice-
review-regulatory-structure-associated-financial [https://perma.cc/PHV5-
7BL5] [hereinafter DOJ COMMENT]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTS ON 
PROPOSED RULES LIMITING OWNERSHIP AND REGULATING GOVERNANCE FOR 
DERIVATIVES CLEARING ORGANIZATIONS, DESIGNATED CONTRACT MARKETS, 
AND SWAP EXECUTION FACILITIES, COMMENTS BEFORE THE U.S. COMMODITY 
FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/com
ments-proposed-rules-limiting-ownership-and-regulating-governance-
derivatives-clearing [https://perma.cc/2RFU-QJWW]; Derivatives Clearing 
Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,334, 
69,355 (Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter CFTC, DCO General Provisions]. 
29 See CFTC, DCO General Provisions, supra note 28, at 69,355; Roe, 
supra note 27, at 1690. 
30 See Chang, supra note 14, at 94–101. 
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financial system.31 Here, the inability of monopolization to 
check parallel exclusion is an immense blind spot within 
antitrust, amounting to hundreds of trillions of dollars.32 
This Article ultimately concludes that the clearing 
markets perpetuate concentration in the dealer markets and, 
hence, exclusion is at play. Yet, in some ways, the conclusion 
is less important than the analysis. By analyzing market 
power, this Article injects a modicum of precision into the 
debate over competition in the derivatives markets.33 An 
assessment of market power is the first step in a fight over 
exclusion.34 Before proving that clearinghouses perpetuate 
dealer dominance, detractors must work through several 
steps, including whether the scheme’s anticompetitive effects 
outweigh the enhanced efficiencies. In measuring the market 
power of the key players and then tethering the findings to a 
cohesive framework, this Article accomplishes a back-to-
basics analysis missing from the debate.35 
 
31 See infra Part IV; see also Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1213 
(“[O]nly some fraction of parallel conduct is exclusionary and some fraction 
of that is both exclusionary and anticompetitive.”). 
32 See infra Section III.A.2, III.B.2 (discussing the size of the OTC 
derivatives markets). See generally Baker, supra note 3, at 528 (discussing 
antitrust’s difficulty in dealing with exclusion). 
33 On the relationship between stability of and competition between 
clearinghouses, compare CFTC Roundtable, supra note 22, at 67 
(comments of Roger Liddell, CEO, LCH ClearNet Group), and supra note 
22, at 71 (comments of Jonathan Short, ICE Trust), with supra note 22, at 
47 (statement of Jason Kastner, Vice Chairman, Swaps and Derivatives 
Markets Association.). 
34 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 6.4 (5th ed. 2011); Hemphill & Wu, supra 
note 6, at 1237–38. 
35 Prior work has been done on the market shares of clearinghouses 
for exchange-traded derivatives. See generally TINA P. HASENPUSCH, 
CLEARING SERVICES FOR GLOBAL MARKETS: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLEARING INDUSTRY (2009). Clearing markets for 
OTC derivatives have been harder to assess, due to the newness of the 
markets. For one of the few analyses in this area, see generally Li Lin & 
Jay Surti, Capital Requirements for Over-the-Counter Derivatives Central 
Counterparties (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 13/3, 2013). On 
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Yet market power analysis of the derivatives markets is a 
difficult endeavor. In antitrust, the proper measure of 
market power has been fraught with controversy.36 The 
prevailing paradigm—using market share as a proxy for 
market power—is the target of fierce criticism.37 By 
undertaking a methodical, if traditional, study of market 
definition and market share in the derivatives world, this 
Article broadly blends antitrust and financial reform 
scholarship. This Article validates the market def-
inition/market share paradigm by showing its ability to 
illuminate blind spots in financial regulation.38 
The remainder of this Article unfolds as follows: Part II 
introduces parallel exclusion and the derivatives markets. 
Part III delves into market power analysis to create a fuller 
picture of the upstream clearing and downstream dealer 
markets.39 Part IV examines the harms of parallel exclusion 
 
concentration in the dealer markets, see OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF 
THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND 
DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FIRST QUARTER 2014 tbl.1 (2014), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-
markets/derivatives/dq114.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U2A-MHL5] [hereinafter 
OCC, 2014 Q1 REPORT] and David Mengle, Concentration of OTC 
Derivatives among Major Dealers, ISDA RESEARCH NOTES, no. 4, 2010  at 1 
(Nov. 1, 2010). 
36 Debate rages, for instance, over whether market share is an 
appropriate proxy for market power. See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define 
Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 440 (2010) [hereinafter Kaplow, Why 
(Ever) Define Markets?]; Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets? 
An Answer to Professor Kaplow, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 740 (2013). 
37 See, e.g., Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, supra note 36, at 
440; Daniel A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 31, 31 (2014). 
38 See infra Section III.B.2. 
39 In upstream (wholesale) markets, firms sell to other firms; in 
downstream (retail) markets, firms sell products to end-users. See 
generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DEFINING THE RELEVANT 
MARKET IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 14 (2014). For this Article’s purposes, the 
clearing market is upstream; the trading (or dealer) market is 
downstream. 
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in the derivatives markets. Finally, Part V discusses the 
benefits. 
II. PARALLEL EXCLUSION AND THE 
DERIVATIVES MARKETS 
Scholars have long recognized the difficulty of antitrust in 
coherently dealing with exclusion.40 Broadly construed, 
exclusion “is designed by the perpetrator to discipline or 
exclude rivals so that it can attain or maintain monopoly 
power.”41 Such practices include monopolization, attempts to 
monopolize, predatory pricing, tying, and some forms of 
vertical integration.42 In doctrine, exclusion typically 
surfaces as a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.43 In 
practice, exclusion often implicates two markets, whereby 
the perpetrator manipulates one market to foster its 
dominance over an adjacent market.44 This Article explores 
just such an arrangement: five derivatives dealers 
controlling a derivatives clearinghouse to protect their 
dominance over the trading market. 
While there has been a sea change to bring exclusionary 
concerns to the forefront of competition policy,45 the impulse 
 
40 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 3, at 527. The difficulty can be 
attributed in part to the decades-long dominance of the Chicago School, 
which has been skeptical of the place of exclusion within antitrust. See id. 
at 528. 
41 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 17.2c, at 715. 
42 Id. 
43 See Baker, supra note 3, at 533–34 (discussing the nuances of this 
association). 
44 See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 
Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). 
45 Leaders in this effort include the Post-Chicago School and the 
Nobel Prize-winning economist Jean Tirole. For excellent summaries, see 
generally Steven C. Salop, Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Vertical 
Conduct: Where Chicago Has Overshot the Mark, in HOW THE CHICAGO 
SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC 
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to cabin exclusion within Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
lingers on.46 This tendency confines the prosecution of 
exclusion to acts by a single perpetrator.47 Recently, 
Hemphill and Wu’s work has illuminated the gray area 
where multiple actors are engaging in parallel exclusive 
behavior without express agreement. For the most part, 
courts have declined to recognize parallel exclusion.48 
Nonetheless, antitrust would benefit from a sustained study 
of one industry over time, where an oligopoly has engaged in 
recidivist exclusion, moving from one scheme to another to 
maintain market power. 
To that end, this Section serves as a primer on two fronts. 
First, this Section discusses Hemphill and Wu’s work on 
parallel exclusion, noting in particular the judicial reception 
of this theory. Next, this Section introduces the derivatives 
markets and provides analysis that corroborates parallel 
exclusion and its harms. 
A.  Parallel Exclusion 
Parallel exclusion is “self-entrenching conduct, engaged in 
by multiple firms, that harms competition by limiting the 
competitive prospects of an existing or potential rival to the 
excluding firms.”49 Notably, the phenomenon occurs in the 
absence of explicit agreement,50 which makes it hard to fit 
parallel exclusion within antitrust’s current framework. 
Without express agreement, anticompetitive behavior by 
 
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 141 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008); Thomas G. 
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising 
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Rey & 
Tirole, supra note 3. 
46 See Baker, supra note 3, at 533–34 (discussing the nuances of this 
association). 
47 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1188, 1236. 
48 See infra Section II.A. 
49 Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1189. 
50 Id. at 1190. 
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multiple actors does not constitute collusion;51 
simultaneously, the behavior cannot satisfy monopolization, 
which is an offense committed by one actor.52 
While not all parallel conduct is anticompetitive or 
exclusive, some pernicious types of parallel exclusion do 
satisfy both thresholds.53 For instance, it is common practice 
for firms to mimic a successful product or follow a fashion 
trend; this would not exclude other market players or hurt 
competition.54 On the other hand, four major airlines sitting 
on a committee that oversees safety standards for LAX and 
independently advocating for rigorous safety standards may 
indeed exclude the operators of shoddily maintained aircraft. 
Even within the realm of parallel exclusion, not all 
practices are on balance harmful. In the example above, high 
standards might lock out some competitors of the four 
airlines from LAX, but reducing the number of airlines can 
simplify the airport’s operations. Additionally, safety 
concerns may more than offset the anticompetitive effects. 
Hence, to separate detrimental and benign parallel 
exclusion, Hemphill and Wu propose an approach that 
requires (i) sufficient monopoly power, (ii) anticompetitive 
effects, and (iii) lack of efficiency justifications.55 
This weighing of anticompetitive effects and enhanced 
efficiencies echoes antitrust’s treatment of exclusion 
generally. For example, traditionally antitrust has 
condemned the exclusionary effects of vertical integration 
only where (i) the firm or firms involved have substantial 
 
51 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007). 
52 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 
U.S. 209, 229 (1993). 
53 More precisely, parallel exclusion must, at a minimum, be 
anticompetitive to be condemned. See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 
1186 (“[W]e do not insist that all parallel exclusion is anticompetitive, nor 
do we think that most parallel conduct is exclusionary.”). 
54 Id. at 1214–15. 
55 Id. at 1237–38. Note that this is one of two broad approaches—
shared monopoly (falling under Section 2) and aggregation of contracts 
(falling under Section 1). See id. at 1235–50. 
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market power, (ii) integration results in significant 
foreclosure of a vertically related market, and (iii) the case 
for enhanced efficiencies is very weak.56 In fact, exclusion, 
vertical integration, and monopolization are often conflated 
and subsumed within a larger Section 2 analysis.57 Hemphill 
and Wu’s decision to house parallel exclusion within Section 
2 must therefore contend with all its doctrinal baggage. Most 
prominently, Section 2 is usually understood to prohibit only 
single-firm behavior. Hemphill and Wu surmount this 
obstacle by exploring, among other paths, the “shared 
monopoly” theory of monopolization, which would harmonize 
treatment of parallel exclusionary practices by both single 
and multiple firms.58 
The “shared monopoly” theory, too, must overcome its set 
of obstacles, chief among them the Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to extend Section 2 to multiple defendants acting 
independently. For example, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly the Court required more than a showing of parallel 
conduct or independence to move a Section 1 claim past 
pleading.59 In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., the Court cast doubt on whether oligopolistic 
price coordination or conscious parallelism would injure 
consumers to the same extent as monopolistic predatory 
pricing, noting that the general occurrence of price 
coordination seemed unlikely.60 Both cases might be read 
narrowly—and Hemphill and Wu certainly do so, by casting 
both as cases about parallel pricing or collusion rather than 
 
56 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 9.3a, at 422; see also id. § 6.4a, at 298. 
57 See Marina Lao, Ideology Matters in the Antitrust Debate, 79 
ANTITRUST L.J. 649, 655–56 (2014). 
58 Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1236–37. 
59 550 U.S. 544, 553–56 (2007). 
60 509 U.S. 209, 227–29 (1993). Oligopolistic price coordination or 
conscious parallelism are practices “by which firms in a concentrated 
market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a 
profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level.” Id. at 227. 
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parallel exclusion.61 Nonetheless, even in recent cases where 
parallel conduct was the basis for a Sherman Act claim, the 
concept of parallel exclusion has enjoyed mixed reception at 
best. 
One recent case is In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust 
Litigation, a consolidated class action against the major 
players in the trading of credit default swaps (“CDS”), where 
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had illegally 
cornered the CDS trading market.62 The causes of action 
included conspiring to fix the bid/ask spreads of dealers in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act63 and conspiring to 
block the emergence of alternate trading and clearing 
platforms in violation of Section 2.64 Conscious of the 
vulnerability of a shared monopoly theory, the plaintiffs 
staked their Section 2 claim on conspiracy to monopolize.65 
 
61 Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1199, 1240–41, 1241 n.246. 
62 See Second Amended Complaint, In re Credit Default Swaps 
Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2014), 2014 WL 
1408256  [hereinafter CDS Antitrust Litig. Complaint]. 
63 The Southern District of New York explained this “spread” as 
follows: 
Market makers—also referred to as “dealers”—sell to 
buyers, buy from sellers, and hold inventory until a match 
emerges. In other words, dealers (the “sell-side” of the 
market) sell CDS investors (the “buy-side” of the market) 
liquidity: the ability to trade without having to wait for a 
counterparty. A dealer offers a “bid” price at which the 
dealer will purchase and an “ask” price at which the dealer 
will sell. By keeping their bid lower than their ask, dealers 
can capture the difference, known as the “bid/ask spread.” 
In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476, 2014 WL 
4379112, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014). 
64 CDS Antitrust Litig. Complaint, supra note 62 at para. 269, 273–
76. 
65 See Plaintiff’s Consolidated Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 45–46, 91 n.85, In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 
13-MD-2476, 2014 WL 4379112 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014), 2014 WL 
2862222, at 25–26, 55 n. 85 [hereinafter CDS Antitrust Litig. Pl.’s Consol. 
Opp.].  
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Conspiracy to monopolize is narrower than shared 
monopoly66 but rests on surer footing.67 
On a motion to dismiss, the Southern District of 
New York permitted the Section 1 claim to proceed 
but dismissed the Section 2 claim.68 The court noted 
that precedent thwarted the shared monopoly 
theory.69 Further, the court would allow the 
conspiracy to monopolize claim only if the plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendants conspired to form a single 
entity to harness monopoly power.70 
On the heels of In re CDS Antitrust Litigation, the Fourth 
Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of a group 
boycott claim against several table saw manufacturers. In 
SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., the plaintiff 
invented and sought to commercialize technology to mitigate 
table saw injuries. The defendants allegedly colluded to 
develop safety standards that imposed unnecessary costs on 
the plaintiff and prevented adoption of its device.71 The court 
found that the plaintiff had adequately pled parallel conduct 
and cited to Parallel Exclusion as support for the “classically 
anticompetitive” effect of defendants’ conduct.72 However, the 
plaintiffs only pled a Section 1 claim.73 SD3 therefore adds 
no new law on monopolization. 
 
66 Shared monopoly encompasses both independent and 
interdependent exclusion, while conspiracy to monopolize covers only the 
latter. See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1236. 
67 In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *13–14. 
68 Id. at *18. 
69 Id. at *13–14. 
70 Id. at *11–12. 
71 SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 418–21 (4th 
Cir. 2015). 
72 Id. at 427. 
73 Arguably, SD3 is a boycott case that falls into the “easier” camp 
within parallel exclusion, where explicit agreement can be traced and the 
oligopoly’s stability is easy to achieve. See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, 
at 1189–90. 
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No recent case has moved toward recognizing parallel 
exclusion as a form of monopolization.74 This stagnancy in 
the law bodes poorly after In re CDS Antitrust Litigation, a 
case this Article will return to several more times, because of 
the prominence the Southern District of New York plays in 
finance-related litigation. As the remainder of the Article 
argues, an outdated conception of Section 2 permits 
dominant players in the derivatives markets to exclude 
rivals while steering clear of Section 1’s prescriptions, with 
profound consequences for competition, consumer welfare, 
and the health of the financial system. 
B. The Derivatives Markets 
Nowhere is concentration in the derivatives industry 
more apparent than the CDS trading market, whose 
evolution exhibits a pattern of recidivist exclusion by the 
dominant dealers. Due to the high degree of customization 
and low degree of liquidity that characterize trading, a few 
dealers—large commercial and investment banks—emerged 
early on as the dominant market-makers.75 At first, these 
dealers were the only institutions capable of managing the 
 
74 The plaintiffs in a Third Circuit case have noted the following in 
their attempt to combine the defendants’ market shares under Section 2: 
The economic reality is that the harm caused by 
Defendants' collective bundling practices does not hinge on 
the presence or absence of agreement: the anticompetitive 
outcome is the same with or without a conspiracy. While 
some courts have declined to adopt this view, the Third 
Circuit has never addressed it. 
Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 
25 n.28, Schuylkill Health Sys. v. Cardinal Health, Inc., No. 12-CV-7065, 
2014 WL 3746817 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2014), 2014 WL 3817671 at 18–19 n. 
28, ECF No. 57 (citing C. Scott Hemphill, Parallel Exclusion: Is It Time for 
a Theory of Shared Monopoly?, American Bar Association Section of 
Antitrust Law Panel Discussion (Sept. 18, 2013); Hemphill & Wu, supra 
note 6). 
75 See In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476, 
2014 WL 4379112, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014). 
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peculiar risks of the market, and they profited handsomely 
for it. Trading revenues for credit derivatives have hovered 
around 10% of trading revenues for all derivatives ($530 
million per quarter, out of $5.517 billion), even though credit 
derivatives comprise only 4.3% of all derivatives.76 
With time, however, innovations sprang up to reduce the 
market’s imperfections, thus eroding dealer margins. 
Trading volumes increased, and the instruments became 
more standardized, which in turn exerted pressure upon the 
market to become more transparent.77 All along, opacity has 
permitted the large dealers to mark up their bid/ask spreads, 
so these changes threatened their supracompetitive 
pricing.78 
According to the plaintiffs in In Re CDS Antitrust 
Litigation, the large dealers responded by capturing the 
intermediaries and standard-setting bodies that were 
ushering in these changes. First, the dealers limited the 
dissemination of CDS pricing information.79 They were able 
to do so because their representatives sat on the board of the 
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (“DTCC”), a 
 
76 In the first quarter of 2016, trading in credit derivatives generated 
$334 million in revenue for banks. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES 
ACTIVITIES, FIRST QUARTER 2016, at 4 (2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/top
ics/capital-markets/financial-markets/derivatives/dq116.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A9NP-RYEX] [hereinafter OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT]. 
Revenue from CDS trading has historically swung wildly, from maximum 
quarterly earnings of $2.727 billion (out of $10.217 billion for trading in all 
derivatives) to maximum quarterly losses of $10.237 billion (out of $10.580 
billion for all derivatives). See id. at 28, graph 9. 
77 Standardization came about because ISDA introduced a Master 
Agreement to document derivatives trades and also because of the 
emergence of CDS indices, which aggregate data for a group of referenced 
entities. See, e.g., In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *2; 
Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 611–12 
(2015). 
78 See Turbeville, supra note 21, at 4; In re Credit Default Swaps, 
2014 WL 4379112, at *1–3. 
79 See In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *2–3. 
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financial services company that compiles real-time post-
trade data.80 DTCC managed to secure from Markit, a 
company that circulates DTCC’s data, an agreement to delay 
dissemination of CDS pricing information to Markit’s 
subscribers. Markit was a named defendant in In re CDS 
Antitrust Litigation, and the large dealers held ownership 
interests in it as well.81 This agreement was contrary to 
Markit’s own self-interest since its pool of subscribers was 
broader than the defendant-dealers. However, sacrificing 
short-term economic self-interest can help to elevate 
independent parallel behavior to conspiracy.82 
Later, when an electronic platform emerged to trade CDS, 
the dealers undermined the venture by collectively directing 
all their trades to ICE Clear Credit, a clearinghouse in which 
the dealers held ownership interests and whose risk 
committee the dealers controlled.83 It was a creative scheme 
of exclusion, leverage, and foreclosure: Dodd-Frank required 
CDS trades to be centrally cleared;84 a joint venture that 
operated its own clearinghouse built an alternative trading 
platform;85 the dealers commanded the lion’s share of CDS 
 
80 Id. at *2. See also Global Trade Repository (GTR), DTCC, 
http://dtcc.com/derivatives-services/global-trade-repository 
[https://perma.cc/9RZD-QXZU]. 
81 See In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *11; 
Memorandum in Support of Markit’s Motion to Dismiss at 10, In re Credit 
Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476, 2014 WL 4379112 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014), 2014 WL 1315324, at 8; CDS Antitrust Litig. Pl.’s 
Consol. Opp., supra note 65, at 36–37. 
82 See American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 
197 (2010); In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *5. 
83 In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *4–5. 
84 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203 §§ 723, 763, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675–82, 1762–84 (2010) 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3).  
85 In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *3. On the 
dominance of one of the joint venture partners, CME Group Inc., in the 
futures market, see Neal L. Wolkoff & Jason B. Werner, The History of 
Regulation of Clearing in the Securities and Futures Markets, and Its 
Impact on Competition, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 313, 373–75 (2010). 
CHANG – FINAL  
No. 3:657] SECOND-GENERATION MONOPOLIZATION 675 
 
trading and routed traffic toward their clearinghouse; 
without this traffic, the upstart clearinghouse could never 
attain high volumes, and the closely linked exchange could 
never get off the ground.86 To bolster this effort, the dealers 
allegedly convinced Markit and the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (“ISDA”), a trade group that created 
documentation for derivatives trading, to forego granting 
licenses to the upstart trading platform.87 Not surprisingly, 
the venture folded soon after it started.88 
For all its intricacies, In re CDS Antitrust Litigation was 
a straightforward case. The defendant-dealers had allegedly 
held secret meetings to coordinate amongst each other and 
with DTCC, ISDA, and Markit in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.89 Horizontal conspiracies such as these have 
always enjoyed primacy in the antitrust hierarchy.90 Given 
the choice, plaintiffs always plead collusion over exclusion.91 
Hence, the case would settle—for $1.87 billion—one year 
after the Southern District of New York allowed the Section 
1 and ancillary claims (but not the Section 2 claim) to go 
forward.92 
 
86 On how this strategy has been deployed elsewhere, see DOJ 
COMMENT, supra note 28, at 1–2. 
87 See In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *4–5. The 
dealers also sat on the boards of Markit and ISDA. Id. 
88 See Louise Story, A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Trading in 
Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/1
2/business/12advantage.html [https://perma.cc/N4NJ-PZBL]. 
89 See In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *4–5. 
90 See Thomas C. Arthur, The Core of Antitrust and the Slow Death of 
Dr. Miles, 62 S.M.U. L. REV. 437, 437 (2009); Baker, supra note 3, at 527–
28. 
91 In fact, the class action complaint in In re CDS Antitrust Litigation 
was peppered with references to collusion. See generally CDS Antitrust 
Litig. Complaint, supra note 62. 
92 See Jesse Drucker & Bob Van Voris, Wall Street Banks to Settle 
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Yet this Article is interested in the much harder scenario 
of what happens afterward. So far, the CDS dealer market 
has not loosened up. Large dealers continue to sit on the risk 
committee of ICE Clear Credit, whose membership roster 
has not expanded.93 We are also not likely to see the type of 
explosive evidence of conspiracy that came to light, without 
which this case would have failed.94 The stasis in the market, 
despite the settlement, is all the more intriguing because it 
hews closely to the reality that parallel action is frequently 
the only thing that plaintiffs can point toward. Evidence of 
horizontal conspiracy, the easier Section 1 claim, is simply 
too difficult to gather. Moreover, if the dominant dealers 
divest ownership in the clearinghouses or own only a minor 
interest,95 the more established Section 2 claim of vertical 
 
93 See infra Section III.B. 
94 See In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476, 
2014 WL 4379112, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014) (“Plaintiffs could not 
have discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence that they 
were injured until December 2010, when the existence of secret meetings 
was first uncovered by the New York Times.”) (citing Story, supra note 88). 
This is especially true in the aftermath of Twombly. For the defendants’ 
Twombly challenges to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ pleadings, see 
Dealer-Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of their Joint Motion to 
Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint at 22–23, In re Credit 
Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-02476, 2014 WL 4379112  
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014), 2014 WL 996473, at 17 [hereinafter CDS 
Antitrust Litig. Dealer Joint Mot.].  
95 In 2008, ICE dove into CDS clearing by purchasing The Clearing 
Corporation, a well-established clearinghouse, with the support of the 
major dealers. See Press Release, IntercontinentalExchange & The 
Clearing Corporation, IntercontinentalExchange, The Clearing 
Corporation, and Nine Major Dealers Announce New Developments in 
Global CDS Clearing Solution (Oct. 30, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/Archives
/edgar/data/1174746/000095014408007998/g16353exv99w1.htm [https://pe
rma.cc/VK73-AYCF]. As for Markit, the extent and effect of the dealers’ 
ownership in the company was a contested issue in the case. See 
Memorandum in Support of Markit’s Motion to Dismiss the Second 
Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 7, In re Credit Default 
Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476, 2014 WL 4379112, (S.D.N.Y. May 
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integration is not available. In In re CDS Antitrust 
Litigation, the defendants repeatedly pounced on the 
dubious status of shared monopoly and parallel conduct in 
antitrust.96 The Southern District of New York ascribed to 
this view. In dismissing the Section 2 claim, the court 
appeared to endorse conspiracy to monopolize only under 
very narrow circumstances—where the plaintiffs allege that 
the defendants conspired to either form a single entity to 
possess monopoly power or seek to allocate a market.97 
Under these first-generation proscriptions of monopolization, 
antitrust law cannot catch up to economic realities. Thus, to 
nudge antitrust toward a more expansive, second-generation 
vision of monopolization, the rest of this Article shall labor 
through the mechanics of parallel exclusion in the OTC 
derivatives markets. 
Before moving on, however, this Subsection shall linger 
on two additional points. First, In re CDS Antitrust 
Litigation should be read as one in a line of cases 
demonstrating the resilience of the dominant dealers at 
retaining market power. This line includes a 2011 
investigation by the European Commission into tactics by 
the dominant dealers to maintain their stronghold over the 
CDS market,98 as well as private actions by pension funds 
 
23, 2014), 2014 WL 2142262, at 6 [hereinafter CDS Antitrust Litig. Markit 
Mem.]. 
96 See CDS Antitrust Litig. Dealer Joint Mot., supra note 94. 
97 See In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *13–14 (citing 
Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 532 F. Supp. 2d 556, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007)). 
98 See Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission 
Probes Credit Default Swaps Market (Apr. 29, 2011), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-509_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/E42G-THD2]. Interestingly, the European Commission 
was investigating whether the dealers’ use of Markit and ICE Clear 
Europe, the dominant CDS clearinghouse in Europe, constituted “collusion 
[analogous to Sherman Act Section 1] between them or an abuse of a 
possible collective dominance [analogous to shared monopoly under 
Sherman Act Section 2].” Id. 
CHANG – FINAL  
678 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
 
and investment banks against the large dealers, ISDA, and 
Markit for illegally cornering the market.99 However it is 
framed,100 this impulse to exclude has characterized the 
dominant dealers’ behavior for decades, regardless of 
whether competitors, consumers, and enforcement agencies 
have prevailed.101 
Second, the CDS market might be the poster child of 
recidivist parallel exclusion, but not all markets behave the 
same way.102 Some markets enable dominant firms to realize 
their dreams of perpetual dominance because certain 
imperfections (including perverse consequences of 
regulation) create the opportunities to do so. Other markets 
are perfectly capable of disciplining these impulses through 
well-functioning competition. Thus, while this Article looks 
to the OTC derivatives markets to substantiate parallel 
exclusion, it is careful to distinguish among the markets for 
 
99 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, MF Glob. Capital LLC v. Bank of 
Am. Corp., No. 13-CV-05417, 2013 WL 7210066 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2013). 
100 That is, whether it is the proclivity of intermediaries to suppress 
efficiencies, see Judge, supra note 77, or simply inevitable business 
practices. 
101 In early 2015, the European Commission closed its proceedings 
against thirteen banks in the CDS investigation. See Press Release, 
European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Closes Proceedings Against 13 
Investment Banks in Credit Default Swaps Case (Apr. 12, 
2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-15-6254_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/56LQ-AFN4]. In July 2016, the European Commission 
closed its investigation into Markit and ISDA after receiving legally 
binding commitments from Markit and ISDA that they would license data 
relating to CDS “on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) 
terms.” See Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission 
Accepts Commitments by ISDA and Markit on Credit Default Swaps (July 
20, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2586_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WMQ2-ATUL]. 
102 Thus, it cannot be said that “a market is a market is a market” 
any more than “a swap is a swap is a swap.” See Gertrude Stein, Sacred 
Emily, in GEOGRAPHY & PLAYS 178, 187 (Univ. of Wisc. Press 2012) (1922) 
(“Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.”). 
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different derivatives and to highlight where the challenges 
are most pronounced. 
III. MARKET POWER ANALYSIS 
If the four major airlines were to control LAX, we would 
have to pursue three lines of inquiry before condemning the 
arrangement.103 First, what is the nature of this “control”? 
Second, what are its harmful effects? Finally, what are its 
benefits? The first question determines whether there might 
be parallel exclusion, which this Section attempts to do for 
the derivatives markets. The remaining two questions, which 
will be taken up in Sections IV and V, separate harmful from 
benign forms of parallel exclusion. 
No examination of exclusion is complete without market 
power analysis of the constituent markets.104 For OTC 
derivatives, economies of scale and network effects work in 
tandem to turn providers of clearing services into natural 
monopolies with significant market power. However, the 
downstream dealer markets are where the real profits lie; 
these markets are also concentrated, with virtually the same 
big banks controlling market activity year after year. If the 
clearing and dealer markets are working together, then 
there is a danger that the bottlenecks operating at thin 
margins (clearinghouses) are being deployed to maintain the 
dominance of the dealers in the adjacent dealer markets. 
 
103 This Article adopts Hemphill and Wu’s three-part approach. See 
Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1237–38 (citing United States v. Grinnell 
Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 
F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam)). This approach is 
common to other types of anticompetitive exclusion. See also HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 34, § 9.3a, at 422 (vertical integration). 
104 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 4.2 (1984), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/lega
cy/2006/05/18/2614.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU4X-3B4S] (stating, as the first 
prong of assessing anticompetitive vertical mergers, a finding that the 
degree of vertical integration is so extensive that entrants to one market 
would also have to enter the second market simultaneously). 
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This Section dissects the intricacies of market power in 
both upstream and downstream markets to assess the 
validity of the charge that the clearing markets are the 
instruments of dealer exclusion.105 Section II.A examines the 
market power of derivatives clearinghouses, focusing in 
particular on clearinghouses for interest rate swaps (“IRS”) 
and credit default swaps (“CDS”), two products that, prior to 
financial reform legislation, had largely been cleared on 
bilateral bases.106 Section II.B examines the market power of 
derivatives dealers, wading into a longstanding debate over 
whether this market is concentrated or not. Section II.C 
examines the mechanisms by which the dominant dealers 
control the clearinghouses. 
In many ways, market power has never been more 
important. The recent work of economists and legal scholars 
has produced keen insights into how firms with market 
power behave.107 Simultaneously, however, the traditional 
measurement of market power—that is, the market 
definition/market share paradigm—has come under 
intensifying assault.108 Therefore, any discourse on market 
 
105 See, e.g., Chang, supra note 14; Greenberger, supra note 21; 
Turbeville, supra note 21. 
106 Before the financial crisis, clearing was performed bilaterally, by 
the counterparties to a trade. In 2009, the Group of Twenty nations made 
centralized clearing a centerpiece of financial reform. With that push, both 
the United States and European Union now require clearinghouses to be 
interposed into derivatives trades. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 §§ 723, 763, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1675–82, 1762–84 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3); 
Parliament and Council Regulation 648/2012, On OTC Derivatives, 
Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, art. 4, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 
17–18 (EU). 
107 See, e.g., ROYAL SWEDISH ACAD. OF SCIS., JEAN TIROLE: MARKET 
POWER AND REGULATION 2, 18, 28 (2014); see also supra note 45. 
108 See, e.g., Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets, supra note 36; 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in Merger Analysis, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 
887, 891, 894–95 (2012); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market 
Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 947 (1981); Joseph Farrell 
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power must also thoughtfully defend its methodology for 
assessment. At the risk of hitching itself to a methodology 
that is slowly growing obsolete, this Article will utilize the 
market definition/market share paradigm, both because of 
its lasting influence on the courts109 and because of its 
capacity to uncover subtle trends in the derivatives 
markets.110 
Specifically, the market definition/market share 
paradigm produces the following observations. First, 
derivatives trading is comprised of distinct geographic 
markets, the largest being the United States and Europe, 
each dominated by a small oligopoly of approximately five 
dealers.111 These large dealers compete fiercely against each 
other within the oligopoly. However, as a block, they adopt 
actions that exclude smaller competitors from breaking into 
the oligopoly. Second, derivatives clearing does not 
necessarily reflect the same geographic fragmentation, since 
one producer dominates the clearing of IRS while two 
producers appear to dominate the clearing of CDS.112 Third, 
in the U.S. trading market, activity should be tracked at the 
bank holding company level, rather than the commercial 
bank level.113 Doing so broadens the tunnel vision of banking 
regulators, who tend to focus on lending and ancillary 
activities.114 Fourth, understanding the delineation between 
commercial bank dealers and investment bank dealers helps 
to parse the sales strategies of the major dealers—in 
 
& Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic 
Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 1 (2010). 
109 See, e.g., Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d 
1188, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2009). 
110 See infra Section III.A.2, III.B.2. 
111 See infra notes 214–215 and accompanying text and Section 
III.B.3. 
112 See infra notes 158–159 and 163–164 and accompanying text. 
113 See infra notes 210–213 and accompanying text. 
114 See infra notes 205 and 211–213 and accompanying text. 
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particular, whether major dealers tie IRS and CDS to the 
provision of credit.115 
A.  The Clearing Markets 
1. Network Effects and Natural Monopoly 
Characteristics 
The producers in the upstream clearing markets are 
derivatives clearinghouses, a type of financial market 
infrastructure (“FMI”) which guarantees the trades of its 
members.116 If a member is unable to fulfill its obligations 
under a trade, the clearinghouse will step in. Membership is 
determined by complicated criteria subject to regulatory 
constraint.117 
By their very design, clearinghouses exhibit strong 
economies of scale—so strong, in fact, that clearinghouses 
can be classified as natural monopolies.118 A natural 
 
115 See infra notes 192–194 and accompanying text. 
116 On FMIs, see generally BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & INT’L ORG. 
OF SEC. COMM’RS, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 
(2012), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2DB-
JPWP]; Supervision and Oversight of Financial Market Infrastructures: 
About, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. (last updated Sept. 2, 2009), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/over_about.htm 
[https://perma.cc/UTW9-TS5X]. The most well-known FMIs are credit 
cards, such as Visa, and payment messaging systems, such as SWIFT. See 
Supervision and Oversight of Financial Market Infrastructures: Private-
Sector Systems, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. (last updated Jan. 29, 
2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/over_pssystems.ht
m [https://perma.cc/QK52-6KMH]. 
117 Such constraints include an open access mandate. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 39.12(a)(1) (2016). For limitations on capital requirements for 
membership, see 17 C.F.R. § 39.12(a)(2)(iii) (2016). 
118 The notion that clearinghouses are natural monopolies is not 
universally accepted. Compare Chang, supra note 14, with HASENPUSCH, 
supra note 35, at 50. See also RUBEN LEE, RUNNING THE WORLD’S MARKETS: 
THE GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 20–21 (2011); DERMOT 
TURING, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT IN EUROPE § 6.41 (2012); Lin & Surti, 
supra note 35, at 5. 
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monopoly arises when a market is more efficiently serviced 
by one producer than multiple ones.119 Common examples of 
natural monopoly occur in industries such as utilities and 
telecommunications, which rely heavily on infrastructure. 
Commentators have also observed FMIs, as infrastructures 
themselves, to be natural monopolies.120 For clearinghouses 
in particular, marginal costs decrease when the intermediary 
grows, due to its ability to perform two significant trading 
functions: netting and compression. 
Netting occurs when a clearinghouse offsets member 
positions. If, for instance, member A owes member B $1 
million on a trade, member B owes member C $1 million on 
another trade, and member C owes member A $2 million on 
a third trade, a clearinghouse can net all three trades into 
one clean result: member C owes member A $1 million. 
Accordingly, member A and member B may not have to post 
additional margin, or collateral, on these trades. Overall, the 
margin that members must post to trade diminishes, since 
the clearinghouse can tap more positions to offset against 
one another.121 
Compression, also known as trade “tear ups,” is the 
replacement of a large trade with a set of smaller trades.122 
The fundamental benchmark of a derivatives trade is its 
notional amount—or the face amount of the contract which 
acts as the basis for exchange of payments. By way of 
illustration, if the counterparties to a $5 million (notional) 
trade have offsetting positions, a clearinghouse can compress 
the trade by replacing it with a trade whose notional is $1 
 
119 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
INSTITUTIONS 123–24 (The MIT Press 1988) (1971). 
120 See, e.g., Thanh Tu Nguyen, EC Antitrust Law in Payment Card 
Systems 13–14 (Mar. 8, 2003) (unpublished master thesis, Lund 
University), http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&record
OId=1554679&fileOId=1563407 [https://perma.cc/J7UE-PY5S]. 
121 For a nuanced analysis of netting, see Roe, supra note 27, at 1660–
62. 
122 See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INTEREST RATE SWAPS 
COMPRESSION: A PROGRESS REPORT 2 (2012). 
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million.123 The counterparties benefit because the payments 
they exchange with one another diminish—for example, if 
one counterparty owes the other 20% of the notional, that 
payment will be $200,000 under the compressed trade ($1 
million notional), as opposed to $1 million under the original 
trade ($5 million notional). Regulators favor compression 
because it lowers the notional amounts floating in the 
derivatives markets, thereby lowering the exposure of 
trading counterparties.124 
Due to the network effects of established clearinghouses, 
potential competitors find it very difficult to penetrate the 
clearing markets. This pattern has been seen with other 
FMIs; indeed, the history of payment systems reveals that 
network effects can quickly propel an early-mover FMI into a 
dominant one.125 As an established FMI grows, it becomes 
increasingly cheaper for the FMI to serve existing customers 
and attract new ones. Marginal cost decreases because the 
network attracts customers.126 This trait is even more 
pronounced with nontraditional infrastructures such as a 
clearinghouse; hard infrastructures, such as roads and 
 
123 See id. 
124 See triReduce Portfolio Compression: Optimizing Leverage Ratios 
and Reducing Risk, TRIOPTIMA http://www.trioptima.com/uploading_image
s/pdf/triReduce%20EU.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GRB-7MLU]. 
125 See, e.g., Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 85, at 313–14 (futures 
clearinghouses); DOJ COMMENT, supra note 28 at 10 (futures 
clearinghouses); Nandini Sukumar & Matthew Leising, LCH.Clearnet in 
Talks to Buy Nasdaq’s Rate Clearinghouse, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 24, 
2012, 10:24 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-24/lch-
clearnet-in-discussion-to-buy-nasdaq-s-rate-clearinghouse 
[https://perma.cc/E884-XQPU] (IRS clearinghouse); Adam J. Levitin, 
Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 
UCLA L. Rev. 1321, 1327 (2008) (credit cards); Publication of an 
Undertaking: Case No IV/36.120 – La Poste/SWIFT + GUF, 1997 O.J. 
(C335) 3, 4 (EC) (SWIFT). 
126 See LEE, supra note 118, at 71–72 (illustrating the interplay of 
network effects, economies of scale, and switching costs in the market 
power of one type of FMI). 
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telephone networks, face capacity issues,127 but FMIs do not 
tend to become congested. An established clearinghouse can 
also fend off potential competitors because members of the 
incumbent clearinghouse can trade so cheaply, due to netting 
and compression. 
2.  Defining the Market 
This Subsection defines the upstream clearing markets 
for two types of OTC derivatives—IRS128 and CDS.129 They 
are the paradigmatic OTC derivatives, traded in 
sophisticated markets directly affected by the Dodd-Frank 
central clearing mandate.130 During the second half of 2015, 
IRS comprised roughly 58.6% of all OTC derivatives; IRS are 
the largest subset of interest rate derivatives, which occupy 
80.0% of the OTC derivatives market.131 CDS occupy roughly 
2.3% of the OTC derivatives market.132 
 
127 See BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF 
SHARED RESOURCES 3–4 (2012). 
128 IRS are derivatives where the referent asset is the fluctuation of 
interest rates. For instance, assume that a borrower takes out a loan at a 
rate of LIBOR plus 3%, at a time when LIBOR is hovering around 2%. 
LIBOR fluctuates up and down. To manage the volatility, the borrower 
(whom we’ll call “Buyer”) purchases an IRS from a financial institution 
(whom we’ll call “Seller”), pursuant to which Buyer pays Seller a fixed 
interest rate of 5% on Buyer’s loan, and Seller pays Buyer the variable 
interest rate of LIBOR plus 3%. 
129 CDS are derivatives whose referent asset is the potential default 
on another obligation. Assume that a borrower takes out a loan from a 
bank. To hedge against the possibility of the borrower’s default, the bank 
(whom we’ll call “Buyer”) might purchase a CDS from a financial 
institution (“Seller”), pursuant to which Seller will pay Buyer the face 
amount of the borrower’s loan in the event that the borrower defaults. 
130 See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, SWAPS INFO 2014 YEAR IN 
REVIEW (2015) [hereinafter ISDA, 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW]; Financial Reform 
Dodd-Frank Central Clearing, GOLDMAN SACHS (2012), 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/gsam/worldwide/insights/FinReg/clearing-
fact-sheet-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L93Q-H5LR]. 
131 See Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, tbl. D5 (2016), http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm 
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Traditionally, market power analysis begins with market 
definition. It is axiomatic that market power is a firm’s 
ability to increase profits by reducing output and charging a 
supracompetitive price for its products.133 Mathematically, 
market power can be expressed as a relationship between 
price and marginal cost, where the larger the markup of 
price over marginal cost, the greater the firm’s market 
power.134 Alternatively, market power can be expressed as an 
inverse relationship with the firm’s elasticity of demand.135 
However, marginal cost and elasticity of demand are 
notoriously difficult to pin down, so quantifying market 
power usually defaults to the surrogate of (i) defining the 
relevant market and then (ii) measuring the market share of 
the scrutinized firms.136 
Customarily, market definition unfolds in two parts: the 
relevant product market and the relevant geographical 
market.137 The product market is calibrated to the smallest 
grouping of sales where the elasticities of demand and 
supply are low enough that a monopolist controlling the 
grouping could reduce output and increase price 
 
[https://perma.cc/Q7RB-SW3J] (follow link to “Foreign exchange, interest 
rate, equity linked contracts” for the “H2 2015” statistics). IRS are the 
bulk of interest rate derivatives (75.2%). Other types of interest rate 
derivatives include forward rate agreements and options. See id. 
132 See id. (follow link to “Commodity contracts, credit default swaps” 
for the “H2 2015” statistics) [https://perma.cc/Q5JM-YV5P]. 
133 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.1. 
134 This is the Lerner index: L = (P – MC)/P, where P denotes price 
and MC marginal cost. See Landes & Posner, supra note 108, at 939–41; 
Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, supra note 36, at 445–46. 
135 L = –1/Ed, where Ed is the firm’s demand curve. Kaplow, Why 
(Ever) Define Markets?, supra note 36, at 446. 
136 See id. at 446–48. Of course, measuring market share is a tricky 
endeavor. Its predicate step of market definition is prone to ambiguity, 
and its value as an approximation for market power has come under fire 
time after time. See supra note 108. 
137 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.1d, at 92. 
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substantially above marginal cost.138 The definition of the 
relevant geographical market unfolds along similar lines.139 
Derivatives markets complicate market definition in 
several ways. First, clearing markets tend toward 
amalgamation, while the underlying products remain non-
fungible. This tension is one of the fundamental challenges 
to the central clearing mandate because non-fungible 
products are difficult to clear.140 Second, evidence suggests 
that the IRS and CDS markets are fragmenting along 
geographic lines.141 The implications of these two trends will 
be discussed in turn. 
By nature, clearing markets gravitate toward one 
naturally monopolistic provider. For example, a dominant 
clearinghouse of IRS can harness its network effects to 
maintain dominance over the market.142 By contrast, the 
underlying products—the derivatives themselves—might be 
highly customized. Derivatives are often designed and sold 
as customized products; buyers of derivatives for hedging 
purposes want products tailored to a narrow risk profile, 
while buyers for speculative purposes want to bet on a 
narrow set of circumstances.143 Either way, these 
 
138 Id. at § 3.2, at 92. Over time, this grouping has acquired the 
shorthand SSNIP: “small but significant and nontransitory increase in 
price.” Id. at § 3.2, at 93 n.2. 
139 Market definition arguably accounts for the geographical market 
in a much more rigorous way than do alternative theories. See Louis 
Kaplow, The Accuracy of Traditional Market Power Analysis and a Direct 
Adjustment Alternative, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1835–45 (1982); Landes & 
Posner, supra note 108, at 963–71. 
140 See CFTC Roundtable, supra note 22, at 49 (statement of Bill Hill, 
Morgan Stanley) (distinguishing between the clearing of a liquid, easy-to-
value single-name CDS based on a corporate obligation versus the clearing 
of an illiquid, difficult-to-value single-name CDS based on sovereign debt). 
141 See infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
142 See supra note 120 and accompanying text; see also Darrell Duffie 
& Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce 
Counterparty Risk?, 1 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 74, 76 (2011). 
143 For instance, the referent in a CDS might be whether a certain 
entity (e.g., a sovereign country or a large corporation) defaults on an 
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transactions are intricately customized and inimitable 
trades. 
The customization of derivatives products is salient not 
just for the trading market, where these products are sold; 
the consequences of customization also spill over to the 
adjacent clearing market. Some IRS and CDS are simply too 
unique to be cleared.144 Hence, in circumscribing a relevant 
product market, we must exclude unclearable derivatives. 
Other types of uncleared derivatives, too, should be 
excluded.145 
i.  Clearing of Interest Rate Swaps 
For IRS clearing, the relevant product market is most 
appropriately defined as the entire worldwide market for 
cleared IRS. Unclearable IRS, as well as IRS trades exempt 
from the clearing mandate, are therefore excluded. An 
alternative that defines the product market as all cleared 
IRS is too broad, since a clearinghouse cannot functionally 
guarantee trades in unclearable products and need not 
guarantee trades between counterparties exempt from the 
 
obligation. This would be a “single-name” CDS. Alternatively, the referent 
might be whether a group of entities defaults on an obligation (a “multiple-
name” CDS). 
144 See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INTEREST RATE SWAPS 
DERIVATIVES: A PROGRESS REPORT ON CLEARING AND COMPRESSION (2014) 
[hereinafter ISDA, INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES]; ISDA, 2014 YEAR IN 
REVIEW, supra note 130. This is despite the fact that clearinghouses are a 
standardizing force on the derivatives markets. The clearing functionality 
demands fungibility in derivatives instruments. If a member defaults on a 
trade, the clearinghouse auctions off that member’s positions; “unwinding” 
the trade substitutes the defaulting counterparty with an altogether 
unaffiliated party. See CFTC Roundtable, supra note 22, at 44 (statement 
of Bill Hill, Morgan Stanley). 
145 “Unclearable” is not the same as “uncleared.” Unclearable trades 
cannot be handled by clearinghouses, while uncleared trades might be 
clearable but for some reason are not cleared—for instance, trades that are 
exempt from the central clearing mandate. Organizations that tabulate 
clearing volumes often switch between the two terms. 
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clearing mandate. Similarly, defining the market as the 
clearing of one specific type of IRS is too narrow. 
The worldwide market definition should be fairly 
uncontroversial; it has been adopted by the few academics 
and industry groups that have sifted through the data 
necessary to calculate market shares.146 However, several 
factors can complicate data analysis. Organizations compile 
data to varying levels of granularity.147 Further, some 
organizations, such as the Bank for International 
Settlements (“BIS”), will double-count cleared derivatives.148 
In other words, BIS counts a trade between clearinghouse 
members A and B as (i) one trade between party A and the 
clearinghouse-guarantor and, separately, (ii) one trade 
between party B and the clearinghouse-guarantor (see 
Figure 1). Given these parameters, another approach is to 
focus on the statistics compiled by one organization while 
noting its methodological limitations. 
In 2014, ISDA undertook an analysis of the interest rate 
derivatives clearing market that accounted for trade 
compression and uncleared and unclearable products.149 
According to ISDA’s calculations, the resulting upstream 
clearing market for interest rate derivatives was 
 
146 See ISDA, INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES, supra note 144, at 2; Lin & 
Surti, supra note 35, at 37–39. ISDA and Lin & Surti have combed 
through data compiled by DTCC, Markit, TriOptima, and BIS, all of which 
track notionals slightly differently. 
147 See ISDA, INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES, supra note 144, at 3 n.1 
(discussing its methodology, as well as the approaches of BIS and DTCC). 
148 See MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, OTC 
DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER 2014, 11, 18 tbl.4 n.1 (2015), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1504.pdf [https://perma.cc/K74U-8TH4] 
[hereinafter BIS, 2014 OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS]. 
149 See ISDA, INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES, supra note 144, at 2–5. To 
be precise, however, it must be noted that ISDA assessed the market for 
interest rate derivatives, which are primarily (but not entirely) comprised 
of IRS. 
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approximately $404 trillion in size as of June 30, 2013.150 
Adjusted for double-counting, the size of the cleared IRS 
market becomes $202 trillion.151 
 







Left: One trade between two clearinghouse members. 
Right: The same trade novated to the clearinghouse and then booked as two 
trades. 
 
ii.  Clearing of Credit Default Swaps 
For CDS clearing, market definition is more protean. In 
the adjacent trading market, liquidity pools—i.e., trading 
activity—for most derivatives have been fracturing for some 
time, so instruments based on U.S. referents are traded 
primarily among U.S. dealers, and instruments based on 
European referents are traded primarily among European 
dealers. This trend is most pronounced in the IRS markets, 
where in fourth quarter 2014, 87.7% of Euro IRS 
transactions occurred exclusively between European 
dealers.152 No comparable studies of market fragmentation 
 
150 As of June 30, 2013, clearinghouses were handling approximately 
$404 trillion in interest rate derivatives. Id. at 3. Trade compression 
eliminated $239 trillion in notionals, resulting in $144–157 trillion in 
uncleared products, comprised of unclearable derivatives ($65 trillion), 
derivatives products denominated in currencies that cannot be cleared 
($10 trillion), and transactions between entities exempt from the clearing 
mandates ($36 trillion). Id. at 3–4. 
151 Id. at 3. 
152 See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, CROSS-BORDER 
FRAGMENTATION OF GLOBAL DERIVATIVES: END-YEAR 2014 UPDATE 2–3 
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have been undertaken for the CDS markets; however, at 
present, there are two major clearinghouses for CDS, both 
operated by the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”)—ICE 
Clear Credit, “the world’s first dedicated CDS clearing 
house,” and ICE Clear Europe, which serves the European 
CDS market.153 
Fragmentation of the downstream trading market has 
not affected the upstream clearing of IRS. As the next 
Subsection shows, one giant clearinghouse, SwapClear, 
provides the lion’s share of clearing services for the world’s 
IRS trades. Yet the CDS clearing markets are serviced by 
two dominant providers, whose footprints are beginning to 
splinter along geographic lines.154 
For now, there is still geographic overlap between the two 
ICE clearinghouses. Thus, this Article treats the global 
market for CDS clearing as one market rather than 
partitioning it into a U.S. market and a European market.155 
This approach yields a market that, in second quarter 2013, 
 
(2015). As a counterpoint, however, fragmentation in the U.S. dollar IRS 
market is subtler. See id. at 9–10. 
153 Credit Derivatives, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., https://www.theice 
.com/credit-derivatives [https://perma.cc/D46C-37UH] (last visited Dec. 
31, 2016). 
154 For products cleared by each entity, see ICE Clear Credit, 
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., https://www.theice.com/clear-credit [https://pe 
rmacc/7FUJ-527W] (last visited Dec. 31, 2016) (follow the link to “CDS 
Cleared Contracts”); ICE Clear Europe CDS, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., 
https://www.theice.com/clear-europe/cds [https://perma.cc/M72W-GMCW] 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2016) (follow the link to “CDS Cleared Contracts”). 
155 This is the approach of Lin & Surti, supra note 35, at 8. 
Nonetheless, there are two other possibilities: (i) defining two clearing 
markets, corresponding to CDS based on U.S. versus European referents, 
and (ii) defining a submarket for European-based CDS within the broader 
market for all cleared CDS. Either alternative risks being criticized for 
prejudicing the ICE clearinghouses by rendering a finding of high market 
share (and, therefore, market power) inevitable. See Kaplow, Why (Ever) 
Define Markets?, supra note 36, at 440. 
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was $5.171 trillion in size.156 Not adjusted for double 
counting, the figure becomes $10.342 trillion.157 
3.  Calculating Market Shares 
In the IRS clearing market, one entity towers above all 
else: SwapClear, the IRS clearinghouse owned by 
LCH.Clearnet.158 In 2013, SwapClear processed $391 trillion 
of the $404 trillion IRS clearing market (96.8%) (see Table 
1).159 By contrast, CME Group cleared $6 trillion (1.49%), 
and the Japan Securities Clearing Corporation (“JSCC”) 
cleared $6.6 trillion (1.63%).160 
 
156 Robust analysis of the CDS clearing market was, until recently, 
fairly difficult to come by. For one study breaking down the CDS market 
into cleared and uncleared segments, see DEPOSITORY TR. & CLEARING 
CORP., CENTRALLY CLEARED CREDIT TRADE ANALYSIS (2013), 
http://www.dtcc.com/repository-otc-data (follow link to “Centrally Cleared 
Credit Trade Analysis”) [https://perma.cc/WJR3-M83H] (calculating new 
cleared trades at $5.171 trillion, or 27.38%, out of a total gross notional of 
$18.88 trillion). More recently, the CFTC and OCC have begun to break 
down the statistics for cleared and uncleared CDS. However, the CFTC’s 
data are compiled from reports by four CFTC-registered swap data 
repositories (“SDRs”) that, though large, do not account for all the SDRs in 
existence. See Weekly Swaps Report: Explanatory Notes, CFTC, 
http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/SwapsReports/ExplanatoryNotes/index
.htm [https://perma.cc/MZQ7-THP4]. The OCC’s data are compiled 
primarily from call reports filed by U.S. banks, savings associations, and 
financial holding companies. See OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at 
3. For consistency with the IRS clearing market analysis, this Subsection 
examines 2013 figures for the CDS clearing market. 
157 DTCC adjusts for double counting. See DEPOSITORY TR. & 
CLEARING CORP., CENTRALLY CLEARED CREDIT TRADE ANALYSIS (2013), 
http://www.dtcc.com/repository-otc-data (follow link to “Explanation of 
Centrally Cleared Trade Analysis”) [https://perma.cc/LFY9-56H4]. 
158 For a description of SwapClear’s rise to prominence, see Natasha 
de Terán, How the World’s Largest Default Was Unravelled, FIN. NEWS 
(Oct. 13, 2008), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2008-10-13/how-the-
largest-default-was-unravelled [http://perma.cc/JB66-52TV]. 
159 ISDA, INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES, supra note 144, at 3; Lin & 
Surti, supra note 35, at 8. 
160 ISDA, INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES, supra note 144, at 3. 
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In the CDS clearing market, ICE Clear Credit and ICE 
Clear Europe are the largest clearinghouses. ICE reported 
that these two clearinghouses cleared a combined $10.2 
trillion in CDS trades in 2012 and $10.7 trillion in 2013.161 
This comports with the growth of the overall CDS trading 
and clearing markets from 2012 to 2013.162 If we assume 
that, in second quarter 2013, the two ICE clearinghouses 
handled approximately $10.2 trillion in CDS trades,163 then 
it becomes clear that these two entities are the dominant 
providers, handling 98.6% of centrally cleared CDS trades 
($10.342 trillion).164 Compared to the ICE clearinghouses, 
the other providers—CME CMDX in North America, Eurex 
Credit Clear and LCH.Clearnet SA in Europe, and JSCC and 
Tokyo Financial Exchange in Japan—are much smaller.165 
 
 
161 INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 48 (2015), 
http://ir.theice.com/~/media/Files/I/Ice-IR/annual-reports/2014/ice-annual-
report-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9ZA-XED4]. 
162 See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, CDS MARKET SUMMARY: 
MARKET RISK TRANSACTION ACTIVITY 3 Chart 3 (2013) (tracing the growth 
of CDS new market activity from $15.0 trillion in 2012 to $17.3 trillion in 
2013). 
163 Trading in derivatives instruments fluctuates wildly. See Todd 
Skarecky, CDS Clearing Data, CLARUS FIN. TECH. (Apr. 14, 2015), 
http://www.clarusft.com/cds-clearing-data [https://perma.cc/PL8R-C7X5]. 
Data on CDS trading and clearing, therefore, can get murky at times, 
depending on the time period analyzed. Another variable is the extent to 
which ICE’s figures double-count the CDS based on European referents 
which are cleared at both ICE Clear Credit and ICE Clear Europe. 
164 See supra note 153 and accompanying text; Lin & Surti, supra 
note 35, at 8 (“[SwapClear and the two ICE clearinghouses] novate close-
to-100 percent of centrally cleared derivatives trades in their respective 
markets.”). 
165 BIS, 2014 OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS, supra note 148, at 11 n.6. 
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TABLE 1: MARKET SHARES FOR THE DOMINANT IRS AND 













IRS $404 trillion SwapClear $391 trillion 96.8% 
CDS $10.342 trillion ICE Clear 






The dominance of SwapClear, ICE Clear Credit, and ICE 
Clear Europe corroborates the hypothesis that 
clearinghouses are natural monopolies. By all estimates, the 
clearing markets for OTC derivatives are poised to grow as 
more trades fall into the scope of the central clearing 
mandate.166 This trend will only strengthen the lock of 
SwapClear and ICE on market share; with time, these 
entities will enjoy greater revenue and be able to net even 
more trades. 
However, for a conclusion of high market power, two 
other variables are relevant: the elasticity of consumer 
demand and the elasticity of rivals’ supply.167 Consideration 
of these two factors shows that the relationship between 
market share and market power is more nuanced than a 
straightforward tautology. Although difficult to measure 
directly, both sets of demand can be easily estimated as 
fairly inelastic. In the clearing markets, consumers (i.e., 
traders) must have their trading activities centrally cleared, 
with few exceptions.168 Consumers cannot seamlessly switch 
between clearinghouses because network effects make it 
 
166 See, e.g., ISDA, 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 130, at 3, 12. 
167 See Landes & Posner, supra note 108, at 939–47. 
168 Dodd-Frank includes exceptions for some end-users as well as 
hedging purposes. Critics have charged that these exceptions are large 
enough to frustrate the spirit behind the law. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, 
Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of Hedging with Credit 
Derivatives, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 813, 855, 875–76 (2014); William F. 
Kroener III, Dodd-Frank Financial Reform and Its Impact on the Banking 
Industry, SS038 ALI-ABA 247, 260 (2010). 
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expensive to choose smaller providers. Thus, the elasticity of 
demand is low. Antitrust sometimes takes comfort in 
competition for a market, even if there is little competition 
within a market.169 But regulation erects such high barriers 
to entry that the few insurgent firms managing to register as 
clearing organizations will have a difficult time wrenching 
away market share from incumbents.170 Hence, the elasticity 
of supply is low. These patterns are consistent with our 
observations that the clearing markets are dominated by 
natural monopolies. 
B. The Dealer Markets 
1.  Concentration and Oligopoly Characteristics 
 The downstream dealer market is characterized by a high 
degree of concentration among an oligopoly of four or five 
large dealers—who, incidentally, happen to be highly 
regulated banks and bank holding companies. In the United 
States, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) 
publishes quarterly reports on bank derivatives positions.171 
These reports reveal that the same institutions always top 
the list: since 2000, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Citibank, and 
Bank of America (or their predecessors) have ranked among 
the largest five dealers.172 Goldman Sachs Bank joined that 
 
169 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 1.4b, at 34. 
170 For the compliance obligations of derivatives clearing 
organizations, see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection 
Act Title VIII, 12 U.S.C. § 5461 et seq. (2015). But see Crane, supra note 
37, at 34 (arguing that exclusion is most concerning not where entry 
barriers are high, but in a zone of middling power where entry barriers are 
surmountable absent anticompetitive conduct). Professor Crane’s insight 
is more relevant to the dealer markets than the clearing markets. 
171 See Quarterly Report on Bank Derivatives Activities, OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-
markets/financial-markets/derivatives/derivatives-quarterly-Report.html 
[https://perma.cc/DT6N-W3K7] (last visited Dec. 31, 2016). 
172 See, e.g., OCC, 2014 Q1 REPORT, supra note 35, at tbl.1; OFFICE OF 
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK 
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list during the financial crisis.173 In its first quarter 2016 
report, the OCC noted that “[a] small group of large financial 
institutions continues to dominate derivative activity in the 
U.S. commercial banking system. During the first quarter of 
2016, four large commercial banks [the above four] 
represented 91.0 percent of the total banking industry 
notional amounts.”174 
 
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FIRST QUARTER 2010 tbl.1 (2010), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-
markets/derivatives/dq110.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SW5-C78H] [hereinafter 
OCC, 2010 Q1 REPORT]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FIRST 
QUARTER 2006 tbl.1 (2006), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-
markets/financial-markets/derivatives/dq106.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD8T-
LZ4V]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BANK 
DERIVATIVES REPORT, FIRST QUARTER 2002 tbl.1 (2002), https://www.occ.tre
as.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/derivatives/dq102.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7HKR-WJZ3]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, OCC BANK DERIVATIVES REPORT, FIRST QUARTER 2000 tbl.1 
(2000), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/ 
derivatives/dq100.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVE4-9NQ7]. 
173 See, e.g., OCC, 2014 Q1 REPORT, supra note 35, at tbl.1; OFFICE OF 
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK 
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FIRST QUARTER 2013 tbl.1 (2013), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/ 
derivatives/dq113.pdf [https://perma.cc/87WY-FJ2J] [hereinafter OCC, 
2013 Q1 REPORT]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S 
QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FIRST 
QUARTER 2012 tbl.1 (2012), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-
markets/financial-markets/derivatives/dq112.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS5S-
R94B] [hereinafter OCC, 2012 Q1 REPORT]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER 
OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND 
DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FIRST QUARTER 2011 tbl.1 (2011),  
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-
markets/derivatives/dq111.pdf [https://perma.cc/32XH-G2AZ] [hereinafter 
OCC, 2011 Q1 REPORT]; OCC 2010 Q1 REPORT, supra note 172, at tbl.1; 
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT 
ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FIRST QUARTER 2009 tbl.1 
(2009), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/ 
derivatives/dq109.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8XA-G3Z4] [hereinafter OCC, 
2009 Q1REPORT]. 
174 OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at 3. 
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Facially, at least, a combined market share this high for 
the largest four dealers (the “four-firm concentration ratio” 
or “CR4”) far exceeds commonly held thresholds for a tight 
oligopoly.175 This degree of concentration confers to the top 
dealers the greatest cut of the lucrative derivatives trading 
revenues, which can reach $7–8 billion per quarter.176 
However, as the rest of this Subsection explores, 
concentration in the dealer markets is more complex than 
the CR4 would suggest. 
Concentration has been alleged to be the consequence of 
central clearing—specifically, the control that dominant 
dealers exert over the indispensable facility of 
clearinghouses.177 JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, Goldman 
Sachs Bank, and Bank of America are all members of 
SwapClear, ICE Clear Credit, and ICE Clear Europe.178 If 
these institutions set high bars to clearinghouse 
membership, then rival dealers will be unable to gain 
entry179—a scenario that appears to be playing out because 
 
175 See, e.g., William G. Shepherd, Concentration Ratios, in 1 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 563 (John Eatwell, Murray 
Mulgate & Peter Newman eds., 1st ed. 1987) (combined concentration 
ratio of 90%); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES 6 (1968) (75%).  
176 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S 
QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, SECOND 
QUARTER 2015 graph 9 (2015), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-
markets/financial-markets/derivatives/dq215.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2KC-
S8RY]. In recent years, trading revenues have comprised, on average, 10–
13% of the gross revenues for the top four banks. See id. at graph 10. For 
Goldman Sachs, a bank with a long history of trading, revenues have 
reached as high as 65–71% of gross revenues. See id. 
177 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 104, § 763. 
178 See Our Clearing Members, SWAPCLEAR, http://www.swapclear.co 
m/service/our-members.html [https://perma.cc/6RE8-KD75] (last visited 
Dec. 31, 2016); ICE Clear Credit Participant List, INTERCONTINENTAL 
EXCHANGE, https://www.theice.com/clear-credit/participants [https://perma 
.cc/YQ8Y-FCMT] (last visited Dec. 31, 2016). 
179 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 45, at 224. 
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the membership profile of the dominant IRS and CDS 
clearinghouses has remained unchanged from year to year.180 
It would be as if, returning to our prior analogy, the four 
dominant airlines set the access criteria for LAX so high as 
to exclude smaller airlines.181 LAX is a labyrinthine 
infrastructure run nearly at cost by the issuance of bonds 
subject to voluminous disclosures.182 Yet, it is also a 
bottleneck for air traffic into Los Angeles and can be 
manipulated to suppress competition in the airlines market, 
where the real revenues lie.183 
Before charges of exclusion can be leveled, though, 
market power must be assessed. It turns out that market 
definition and the calculation of market shares are even 
trickier for the downstream dealer markets than for the 
upstream clearing markets. There are strong disagreements 
over whether the dealer markets truly are concentrated. 
From the OCC’s viewpoint, a perennial four-firm oligopoly 
cornering over 90% of the trading market means that the 
market is concentrated.184 However, ISDA, the derivatives 
dealer trade group, maintains that trading is a global 
market, and when dealer notionals are evaluated from a 
global perspective, concentration diminishes.185 At the other 
end, the BIS gauges dealer concentration by slicing the 
market into discrete products—for example, IRS based on 
the U.S. dollar, Canadian dollar, euro, Swiss franc, Sterling, 
 
180 See infra Section IV.A. 
181 Coincidentally, air traffic through LAX is dominated by four 
carriers. See LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TOP 10 CARRIERS, 
JANUARY 2015 THROUGH AUGUST 2015, L.A. WORLD AIRPORTS, 
http://www.lawa.org/uploadedfiles/LAX/statistics/aircarrier-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R3JY-G8H3]. 
182 See Airport Basics, L.A. WORLD AIRPORTS, http://www.lawa.org/our 
LAX/ourLAX.aspx?id=9143 [https://perma.cc/JG5J-VER2] (last visited 
Dec. 31, 2016).  
183 Cf. CFTC Roundtable, supra note 22, at 47 (statement of Jason 
Kastner, Vice Chairman, Swaps and Derivatives Markets Association). 
184 See supra notes 170, 172, 174. 
185 See Mengle, supra note 35, at 1–3, 5. 
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Swedish krona, and Japanese yen.186 The result, 
counterintuitively, is that concentration is rather low.187 
Consistent with Professor Kaplow’s analysis, both sides of 
the debate define the market in the way that best supports 
their respective arguments.188 
Even if the market is concentrated, explanations for this 
result might vary. First, CDS dealers have historically been 
large, well-capitalized financial institutions because default 
on an underlying obligation can require the dealer to pay a 
substantial amount to close out the position.189 Dealers 
hedge their positions by entering into offsetting swaps with 
other large, well-capitalized financial institutions—thereby 
consolidating the notionals, as well as the risks, within a 
small circle of big banks.190 
Second, derivatives products, in particular IRS, may be 
purchased as a condition for obtaining a loan.191 In lending to 
a borrower at a variable rate, a bank might ask that the 
borrower take out an IRS so as to mitigate the volatility of 
fluctuating rates and protect the bank’s interest in the 
 
186 See BIS, 2014 OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS, supra note 148, at 23 
tbl.9a. 
187 See id. 
188 See Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, supra note 36, at 470–74. 
189 ROBERT E. LITAN, INITIATIVE ON BUS. & PUB. POLICY AT BROOKINGS, 
THE DERIVATIVES DEALERS’ CLUB AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS REFORM: A 
GUIDE FOR POLICY MAKERS, CITIZENS AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES 28 
(2010), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0407_deriv 
atives_litan.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8P6-XL8W]. See also CDS Antitrust 
Litig. Markit Mem., supra note 95, at 5 (describing the “cliff risks” of 
CDS). 
190 LITAN, supra note 189, at 28. 
191 For empirical evidence on the prevalence of tying, see generally 
ASS’N OF FIN. PROF’LS, 2004 CREDIT ACCESS SURVEY: LINKING CORPORATE 
CREDIT TO THE AWARDING OF OTHER FINANCIAL SERVICES 4 (June 2004); 
CTR. FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, TYING AND OTHER POTENTIALLY 
UNFAIR COMMERCIAL PRACTICES IN THE RETAIL FINANCIAL SERVICE SECTOR 
12, 14–16 (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2010/tying/docs/ 
report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY87-3NJT]. 
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underlying credit.192 Coincidentally, three of the top 
derivatives dealers are also the nation’s largest commercial 
banks: JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citibank.193 
This coincidence might be the result of decisions by 
borrowers to purchase swaps from well-capitalized dealers, 
or it might be attributed to the tying of swaps to loans—a 
requirement that the lender imposes upon the borrower to 
buy swaps from an affiliate of the lender.194 
For our purposes, the above details affect how the market 
is defined to either validate or dispel claims of concentration. 
How broadly we draw the geographic and product markets 
affects our perspective on concentration. So, too, does how we 
account for the market shares of (i) large lending institutions 
that are smaller participants in the derivatives trading 
market and, conversely, (ii) large derivatives dealers that are 
smaller participants in the lending market. In defining the 
dealer market and then calculating the market shares, the 
remainder of this Subsection addresses these considerations. 
2.  Defining the Market 
i.  The Product Market 
The easiest way to define the byzantine dealer market is 
to proceed, as above, with a straightforward analysis of the 
 
192 See Anti-Tying Restrictions of Section 106 of the Bank Holding 
Company Act Amendments of 1970, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,024, 52,032 (Aug. 29, 
2003). 
193 See Statistical Release, FED. RESERVE BD., INSURED U.S.-
CHARTERED COMMERCIAL BANKS THAT HAVE CONSOLIDATED ASSETS OF $300 
MILLION OR MORE, RANKED BY CONSOLIDATED ASSETS, AS OF JUNE 30, 2015 
(2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/20150630/lrg_bnk_lst.pd
f [https://perma.cc/68WR-Q2MP]. 
194 If so, then commercial banks are leveraging their dominance in the 
lending market (where, these days, low interest rates constrict return on 
investment) into dominance in the dealer market (where the profits are 
much greater). See Felix B. Chang, Death to Credit as Leverage: Using the 
Bank Anti-Tying Provision to Curb Financial Risk, 9 NYU J. L. & BUS. 
851, 903–05 (2013). 
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relevant product and geographic markets.195 The central 
question in defining the product market is whether we look 
at the dealer market for all derivatives or whether we define 
the market around specific products. The OCC examines 
notional amounts for all derivatives, as well as futures 
(exchange-traded),196 options (OTC and exchange-traded),197 
forwards (OTC),198 spot foreign exchange,199 swaps (OTC), 
and credit derivatives (OTC).200 BIS breaks down the 
markets into even smaller slivers—e.g., IRS by referent 
currency.201 
This Article opts to combine all IRS into one market and 
all CDS into another market so as to align with the product 
market definition for clearing services. In doing so, this 
Article uses OCC data on notional amounts for the “swaps” 
and “credit derivatives” categories, which correspond closely 
(but not perfectly) to IRS and CDS.202 For the largest dealers, 
 
195 See supra Section III.A.2. 
196 A future is the obligation to buy or sell a position at a 
predetermined price (the “strike” price). 
197 An option is the right to buy or sell a position when the value of 
that position attains the strike price. Options can either be exchange-
traded or OTC. 
198 Like futures, a forward is the obligation to buy or sell at a 
preordained strike price; however, forwards are customized and traded 
over-the-counter, rather than on exchanges. 
199 A spot foreign exchange is a one-time foreign exchange (i.e., 
currency exchange) transaction between two parties. 
200 OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at tbl.1. 
201 See BIS, 2014 OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS, supra note 148, at 
tbl.9a. 
202 The correspondence is imperfect because “swaps,” as used by the 
OCC, is slightly broader than IRS. The OCC’s figures for swaps are taken 
from call reports that group the figures for interest rate, foreign exchange, 
equity, commodity, and other swaps together. See FED. FIN. INSTS. 
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF CONSOLIDATED 
REPORTS OF CONDITION AND INCOME, Item 14.e, at RC-L-17, http://www.ffie 
c.gov/pdf/ffiec_forms/ffiec031_034inst_200006.pdf [https://perma.cc/93JH-
HLBE]. See also OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT supra note 76, at 13–14. 
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IRS constitute 77.2–93.5% of swap notionals.203 CDS make 
up 95.0% of all credit derivative notionals.204 
Beyond antitrust, the tendency of financial regulators is 
to aggregate notionals for all derivatives products (exchange-
traded and OTC) in order to generate an easy snapshot of 
derivatives notionals as compared to assets held. This 
snapshot helps regulators gauge the extent of leverage.205 
Yet this is too broad a perspective for our purposes.206 
Alternatively, it might make sense to define the product 
market around all OTC derivatives, since the dealers that 
dominate the IRS and CDS markets also dominate the OTC 
forwards and options markets.207 Because clearinghouses 
have the capacity to net across different instruments—and 
will likely do so in the future—amalgamating all OTC 
derivatives into one market anticipates that shift in the 
upstream market.208 
 
203 See Citibank, N.A., CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND 
INCOME FOR A BANK WITH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OFFICES—FFIEC 031 44 
(June 30, 2016) (Item 13, Schedule RC-L); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND INCOME FOR A BANK WITH 
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OFFICES—FFIEC 031 44 (June 30, 2016) (Item 13, 
Schedule RC-L); Bank of America, N.A., CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF 
CONDITION AND INCOME FOR A BANK WITH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OFFICES—
FFIEC 031 44 (June 30, 2016) (Item 13, Schedule RC-L); Goldman Sachs 
Bank USA, CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND INCOME FOR A BANK 
WITH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OFFICES—FFIEC 031 44 (June 30, 2016) 
(Item 13, Schedule RC-L) (all reports available at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/publi 
c/ManageFacsimiles.aspx). Note that these figures are taken from the call 
reports for the large commercial banks rather than bank holding 
companies. For the significance of the distinction between these two types 
of financial institutions, see infra notes 210–213 and accompanying text. 
204 OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at 13. For a breakdown by 
bank, see also id. at tbl.12. 
205 See, e.g., id. at tbl.1. 
206 On the other hand, BIS defines the market too narrowly, by 
carving up IRS into referent products. See supra notes 186–187 and 
accompanying text. 
207 See OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at tbl.1. 
208 See, e.g., Duffie & Zhu, supra note 142, at 90 (arguing that a 
universal clearinghouse which can net across assets maximizes netting 
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An ancillary question is whether the product market 
should track dealers which are commercial banks. Given 
that IRS and CDS might be tied to loans,209 trading at the 
commercial banks would seem the appropriate benchmark. 
However, this Article argues that the market should be 
defined around the trading activities of bank holding 
companies (“BHCs”). A BHC is a company that owns or 
controls one or more banks;210 the subsidiaries might be 
engaged in commercial lending, or they might be engaged in 
other activities, such as investing or selling insurance. 
Today, with tighter capital adequacy requirements for 
banks,211 derivatives trading activity has migrated away 
from commercial banks and into the realm of other 
affiliates.212 Notional amounts at the BHC level illustrate 
this movement.213 
Although trading figures for commercial banks create the 
impression of a four-firm oligopoly,214 the figures for BHCs 
reveal instead that five firms have cornered the dealer 
market: JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Bank 
of America, and Morgan Stanley.215 A five-firm oligopoly is 
more difficult to condemn than a four-firm one since 
 
efficiency). At the very least, however, the demarcation between exchange-
traded and OTC derivatives should be preserved because the clearing and 
trading of exchange-traded products is quite different. See Wolkoff & 
Werner, supra note 85. 
209 See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text. 
210 See National Information Center, All Institution Types Defined, 
FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/Co 
ntent/HELP/Institution%20Type%20Description.htm [https://perma.cc/P7
RF-5BGB] (last visited Dec. 31, 2016). 
211 See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE 
RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2011). 
212 See OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at 4–5. 
213 Compare id. at 4 tbl.1, with id. at 4 tbl.2 (revealing that 
derivatives notionals are typically higher at the BHC level than the 
commercial bank level for most institutions). See also id. at 5 fig.1. 
214 See id. at tbl.1. 
215 See id. at tbl.2. 
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exclusionary schemes will be harder to create and enforce 
among five players compared to four.216 Nonetheless, this is 
the more accurate approach; as Section III.C demonstrates, 
clearinghouse membership rosters always include Morgan 
Stanley, in addition to affiliates of the large commercial 
banks. Morgan Stanley, like Goldman Sachs, had 
traditionally been an investment bank that, during the 
financial crisis, reorganized into a BHC with a commercial 
bank subsidiary to avail itself of federal funds.217 
ii.  The Geographic Market 
This Article advocates carving out the United States as a 
standalone geographic derivatives market.218 Derivatives 
dealers can trade across distances easily, but their 
consumers’ preferences tend to be more local.219 For example, 
the trading activities of HSBC North America Holdings, Inc. 
(“HSBC”) reflect the localized nature of the dealer market. A 
subsidiary of the London-based HSBC Holdings plc, HSBC 
ranks sixth in its total derivatives notionals according to the 
 
216 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1230 (stating that oligopoly 
size is important in determining the stability of parallel exclusion). 
217 See Michael J. de la Merced et al., As Goldman and Morgan Shift, 
a Wall St. Era Ends, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 21, 2008, 9:35 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/goldman-morgan-to-become-bank-
holding-companies [https://perma.cc/T35A-HWTJ]. Today, Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley have diverged slightly in that most of Goldman 
Sachs’ trading activities are undertaken at the commercial bank level, 
while most of Morgan Stanley’s trading activities are conducted outside 
the commercial bank. Compare OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at 
tbl.1, with id. at tbl.2. 
218 Clearing markets, by contrast, are global because netting can be 
performed rather effortlessly across borders; clearinghouses also draw 
members from large financial institutions around the world. See infra 
Section III.C. 
219 For instance, a Dallas-based airline might purchase an oil swap 
from a Houston- or Chicago-based dealer; the dealer itself will hedge its 
exposure with one of the dominant U.S.-based dealers. 
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OCC.220 While HSBC is a global player in the financial 
markets, especially in Europe and Asia, its position is far 
weaker in the United States. Indeed, affiliates of HSBC are 
members of every major clearinghouse,221 but their market 
share within the United States cannot compare with the 
shares of the large U.S. dealers.222 Thus, the dealer markets 
are most appropriately defined as the overall market for IRS 
and the overall market for CDS—or, alternatively, all OTC 
derivatives—sold in the United States. 
Currently, the OCC’s quarterly reports are the best 
source on the size of dealer markets. Relying on the OCC’s 
methodology, however, is vulnerable to criticism because the 
OCC’s methodology factors in the global trading activity of 
U.S. dealers and it fails to account for the U.S. trading 
activity of dealers domiciled outside the United States.223 In 
the absence of data focusing solely on activity in the U.S. 
geographic market, we must contend with the OCC’s 
numbers, along with all its drawbacks. Regarding the role of 
non-U.S. dealers, that concern is less powerful—consumers 
of derivatives products purchase from the providers in their 
local or national market. Further, if the tying of swaps to 
loans is prevalent,224 then it is all the more likely that 
derivatives are sold by affiliates of the local or national 
lender.225 
From the OCC’s numbers, we can calculate the sizes of 
the dealer markets as approximately $139.603 trillion for 
 
220 OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at tbl.2. HSBC’s swaps 
notionals total $5.733 trillion, compared with $15.899 trillion for fifth-
ranked Morgan Stanley, and HSBC’s credit derivatives total $185 billion, 
compared with $1.412 trillion for fifth-ranked Morgan Stanley. Id. 
221 See infra Section III.C. 
222 See OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at tbls.1 & 2. 
223 Mengle, supra note 35, at 1–2. 
224 See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text. 
225 But see Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How 
Derivatives Changed the “Business of Banking”, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 
1041–42 (2009) (chronicling how the OCC broadened the business of 
banking concept to cover dealing in financial risk). 
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swaps (i.e., IRS), $10.820 trillion for credit derivatives (i.e., 
CDS), and $225.316 trillion for all OTC derivatives (see 
Table 2).226 
 
TABLE 2: ASSETS AND NOTIONAL AMOUNTS (IN MILLIONS 
OF DOLLARS) FOR SELECTED U.S. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 
(“BHC”) IN DESCENDING ORDER OF RANK227 
 








1. Citigroup 1,800,967 55,624,082 30,518,526 2,081,895 47,833,660 
2. JPMorgan  
Chase 2,423,808 52,352,138 29,019,815 3,136,988 49,946,925 
3. Goldman 
Sachs 
878,102 52,257,748 28,818,811 1,979,810 45,682,587 
4. Bank of 
America 
2,188,633 42,998,807 23,890,121 1,964,913 39,381,707 
5. Morgan 
Stanley 
807,497 28,281,106 15,899,169 1,412,322 25,456,239 
6. HSBC NA 289,057 7,611,043 5,773,336 184,616 6,863,887 
7. Wells 
Fargo 1,849,182 5,908,234 4,012,949 29,207 5,548,936 
8. State 
Street 
243,685 1,341,462 11,505 37 1,328,140 
9. BNY 
Mellon 
372,870 1,032,454 352,635 405 996,003 
Top 25 BHCs 







226 OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at tbl.2. Importantly, these 
figures are not adjusted for double-counting from inter-dealer 
transactions. See Mengle, supra note 35, at 1. The OCC pulls these 
numbers from the call reports filed by banks and BHCs. Therefore, if 
Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase have entered into a $10 million 
trade, the trade will be reported by both parties in their call reports, for a 
total of $20 million. 
227 The figures are taken from OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, 
at tbl.2. Dealers ranked 6–9 are included for comparative purposes. 
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3.  Calculating Market Shares 
Market shares at the BHC level show that a five-firm 
oligopoly has cornered well over 91% of the relevant markets 
(see Table 3).228 
 
TABLE 3: MARKET SHARES FOR THE DOMINANT U.S. 
DEALERS 
 





1. Citigroup 21.86% 19.24% 21.23% 
2. JPMorgan Chase 20.79% 28.99% 22.17% 
3. Goldman Sachs 20.64% 18.30% 20.27% 
4. Bank of America 17.11% 18.16% 17.48% 
5. Morgan Stanley 11.39% 13.05% 11.30% 
 
But what do these market shares mean? Asked another 
way, what insights can we glean about market power from 
the fact that this much of the market belongs to the top five 
dealers? Without some archetype for appropriate market 
concentration, these numbers are meaningless.229 
Fortunately, market share need not be assessed in a 
vacuum. Other factors demonstrate the market power that 
these five firms exercise.230 As we shall see, there might be 
intense competition within the five-member oligopoly,231 but 
 
228 Id. 
229 This is one of Professor Kaplow’s most emphatic critiques of the 
market definition/market share paradigm. See Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define 
Markets?, supra note 36, at 459–62; see also Crane, supra note 37, at 35–
39. 
230 Context is important; a five-firm oligopoly in derivatives trading 
reflects different dynamics than a five-firm oligopoly in other industries. 
Antitrust devises tools such as anticompetitive effects and procompetitive 
justifications that inform this context. 
231 See CDS Antitrust Litig. Dealer Joint Mot., supra note 94, at 28 
(“[T]here are no factual allegations that the twelve dealer-defendants 
failed to compete with each other in their OTC trading of CDS (to the 
contrary, they compete fiercely).”). 
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the oligopoly might nonetheless stifle competition from 
smaller dealers. 
An analysis of market concentration can forecast the 
behavior of the five dealers. Decades ago, the prevailing 
measure of concentration was the four-firm concentration 
ratio (“CR4”).232 Measured at the BHC level, the CR4 is 
80.40% for IRS, 84.69% for CDS, and 81.15% for all OTC 
derivatives.233 These CR4s surpass the thresholds at which 
exacting scrutiny of mergers is triggered. A CR4 greater 
than 75% is ostensibly so high that a market is presumed to 
be conducive to coercion.234  
The contemporary approach to market concentration is 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”), which is the sum 
of the squares of the market shares of all firms within a 
market. This measure accounts for “both the distribution of 
the market shares of the top four firms and the composition 
of the market outside the top four firms.”235 For the relevant 
dealer markets, the approximate HHIs are as follows: 1785 
for IRS, 2049 for CDS, and 1803 for all OTC derivatives.236 
These numbers fall into the “moderately concentrated” range 
 
232 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 12.4a1, at 697–98. 
233 See supra Table 3. 
234 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 698 (noting that a vague 
consensus emerged that a CR4 exceeding 75% was conducive to coercion). 
On the other side, ISDA has measured the CR4 at 40.0% for interest rate 
derivatives, 40.8% for credit derivatives, and 39.5% for all derivatives. See 
Mengle, supra note 35, at 3. This is because ISDA insists that derivatives 
activity is global in nature and, thus, the market should be defined 
globally. See id. at 1–2. In doing so, global notionals are divided among 
roughly 14 dealers rather than five. Id. at n.2. 
235 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 1.5 (1992, rev 1997), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/at
tachments/merger-review/hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FRH-2MAM] 
[hereinafter DOJ, 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
236 See OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at tbl.2. Note again that 
BIS has calculated much smaller numbers, due to its definition of the 
dealer market as global. 
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under today’s Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Merger 
Guidelines.237 
It is difficult to determine whether the HHI or the CR4 is 
the better benchmark in this industry. The CR4 is a better 
predictor of collusion where the major players are similar in 
size, while the HHI better depicts a non-cooperative oligopoly 
where the major players differ in size.238 The derivatives 
dealer market is somewhere in between: the largest five 
dealers are similar, but not identical in size, and each of the 
five is several times larger than all dealers outside the 
oligopoly. The slight differences within the group of five are 
likely not significant enough that any single dealer is the 
price leader; in fact, the order of the top four dealers has 
shifted from quarter to quarter.239 Neither the HHI nor the 
CR4 alone fully portrays the dynamics of the dealer market, 
especially since each measure entails its own narrative—
collusion for CR4 and non-cooperative oligopoly for HHI. On 
balance, though, because this Article focuses on parallel 
(that is, independent) exclusion, the HHI narrative is more 
fitting. However, In re CDS Antitrust Litigation shows that 
collusion is hardly beyond the pale for the large dealers. 
An analysis of entry barriers also clarifies market share 
calculations. Unlike the clearing markets, the downstream 
dealer markets are not beset by large sunk costs and high 
regulatory barriers. Indeed, the OCC’s quarterly reports 
show that a number of firms are active in the derivatives 
 
237 In prior years, the threshold for high concentration was lower. 
Compare U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES, § 5.3 (2010), with DOJ, 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES, supra note 235, § 1.5. 
238 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 698–704. 
239 See, e.g., OCC, 2014 Q1 REPORT, supra note 35, at tbl.1; OCC, 2013 
Q1 REPORT, supra note 173, at tbl.1; OCC, 2012 Q1 REPORT, supra note 
173, at tbl.1; OCC, 2011 Q1 REPORT, supra note 173, at tbl.1; OCC 2010 Q1 
REPORT, supra note 172, at tbl.1; OCC, 2009 Q1 REPORT, supra note 173, at 
tbl.1. 
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markets.240 Yet this does not mean that these “moderately 
concentrated” markets, under the DOJ’s HHI benchmark,241 
are beyond reproach. Far from it. Where a small group of 
firms enjoys “middling market power,” exclusion is arguably 
of greater concern, since entry barriers are surmountable 
and anticompetitive conduct is required to keep rivals out.242 
The persistence of concentration—at the hands of the same 
dealers—therefore suggests that exclusion is at work. 
Perennial dominance by the same firms therefore 
constitutes a third feature that helps interpret concentration 
in the dealer markets. An oligopoly’s stability bespeaks 
exclusion.243 As discussed in greater detail in the next 
Subsection, stability confirms that the dealer oligopoly’s high 
market shares translate into—or are evidence of—
substantial market power in a manner that enables 
exclusion. 
The picture that emerges from the calculation of market 
shares, then, is one where competition is suppressed at the 
national level. The clearing markets for IRS and CDS might 
be global, but the trading markets are broken up into 
countries or regions, each dominated by a small circle of 
financial institutions that have an uncanny ability to 
maintain dominance regardless of market transformations. 
C.  Stability of the Dealer Oligopoly 
Parallel exclusion requires a finding that there is 
sufficient market power to produce anticompetitive effects.244 
Simply noting that two complementary markets are 
 
240 See supra note 236. Even beyond regulated banks and BHCs, there 
are hedge funds actively trading derivatives. See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman 
& Katy Burne, ‘London Whale’ Rattles Debt Market, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 
2012 1:19 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303299604 
577326031119412436 [https://perma.cc/G74S-FK3F]. 
241 See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
242 See Crane, supra note 37, at 34, 52–54. 
243 Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1222–26. 
244 Id. at 1237. 
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concentrated is not enough to conclude that parallel 
exclusion is at work, much less pernicious exclusion whose 
anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive 
justifications. For this reason, Professors Hemphill and Wu 
add another factor to the market power inquiry: the stability 
of the excluders.245 Where the dominant players are few, 
exclusionary schemes are more likely to succeed.246 
This intuition bears out in the derivatives markets, whose 
infrastructures are susceptible to capture by major dealers. 
It turns out that the major dealers drive clearinghouse 
membership and risk standards, and even when those 
standards change, clearinghouse membership profiles 
remain the same.247 This stasis validates the intimations of 
market power from market share analysis. It also fits within 
a wider trend: the ingenuity of the dealer oligopoly at 
preserving dominance. 
For years, the five large dealers have controlled trading 
in OTC derivatives. While their precise order within the 
oligopoly might have shifted from quarter to quarter, as a 
block they have pulled far ahead of all other dealers.248 Thus, 
other than reorientation inside the oligopoly, no other dealer 
has managed to break into the oligopoly. In this respect, the 
evolution of the CDS dealer market is especially poignant. 
The top five dealers dominated this market before In re CDS 
Antitrust Litigation and during its proceedings; in the first 
two quarters following settlement, the results have not 
changed.249 The membership rosters for ICE Clear Credit 
 
245 Id. at 1237–38. 
246 Id. 
247 See infra notes 252–254 and accompanying text. 
248 See, e.g., supra notes 227, 239. 
249 Compare OCC, 2012 Q1 REPORT, supra note 173, at tbl.2, with 
OCC, 2014 Q1 REPORT, supra note 35, at tbl.2. See also OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK 
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, SECOND QUARTER 2016 tbl.2 (2016), 
https://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-
markets/derivatives/dq216.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ4S-K6WV]; OFFICE OF 
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK 
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and ICE Clear Europe, which are updated more frequently 
and which can serve as loose proxies for the headway of 
smaller dealers, barely changed before, during, and after the 
case.250 
This pattern of stagnancy is replicated across the IRS and 
CDS clearinghouses. As Table 4 shows, there is a remarkable 
degree of correlation among the members of SwapClear, ICE 
Clear Credit, and ICE Clear Europe.251 Affiliates of the major 
players in the U.S. dealer markets are all represented, along 
with Wells Fargo in some instances. The other members are 




TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, THIRD QUARTER 2016 tbl.2 (2016), 
https://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/derivatives/ 
dq316.pdf [https://perma.cc/V68X-RT3H]. 
250 See infra notes 257–259 and accompanying text. 
251 On dangers of correlation, see infra Section IV.C and Roe, supra 
note 27, at 1677–78. 
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TABLE 4: CORRELATION AMONG LARGE MEMBERS OF THE 







Bank of America 255 X X X 
Barclays X X X 
BNP Paribas X X X 
Citigroup X X X 
Credit Suisse X X X 
Deutsche Bank X X X 
Goldman Sachs X X X 
HSBC X X X 
JPMorgan X X X 
Morgan Stanley  X X X 
Nomura X X X 
Société Générale X X X 
The Bank of Nova Scotia X X  
UBS X X X 




252 See SWAPCLEAR, Our Clearing Members, supra note 178; 
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, Participants, supra note 178; ICE Clear 
Europe Membership, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, https://www.theice.co 
m/clear-europe/membership#iceu-J [https://perma.cc/434K-J5B7] (last 
visited Dec. 31, 2016). This table consolidates affiliates of the members 
into one entry. 
253 SwapClear has two lists: U.S.-Domiciled Service Members and a 
much larger group of Global Service Members. All the entries here are 
taken from the U.S.-domiciled member list, except Bank of America, 
HSBC, and The Bank of Nova Scotia, which appear under the global 
members list. See SWAPCLEAR, Our Clearing Members, supra note 178. 
254 ICE Clear Europe’s members trade in CDS and futures. This table 
includes only CDS traders. Among these entities, only Bank of America, 
Citi, JPMorgan, and Morgan Stanley are domiciled in the United States. 
The other members (e.g., Goldman Sachs) hold membership in the name of 
European affiliates. See INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, ICE Clear Europe 
Membership, supra note 252.  
255 Merrill Lynch is counted as an affiliate of Bank of America. 
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The exclusive nature of clearinghouses was at issue in In 
re CDS Antitrust Litigation, where the plaintiffs alleged that 
even well-capitalized applicants could not break in as 
members.256 Despite the settlement, the membership profiles 
today are virtually identical to the membership profiles 
when the case was pending. From June 2015 to February 
2016, for instance, the only change to ICE Clear Credit was 
that The Royal Bank of Scotland pulled out.257 During this 
time, ICE Clear Europe saw no change in its members who 
trade in CDS.258 Among its U.S.-domiciled members, 
SwapClear saw no change either.259 
This inertia is all the more astonishing given the strong 
regulatory pressure to loosen membership criteria. Since 
Dodd-Frank mandated central clearing for OTC derivatives, 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have 
implemented rules aimed at tempering the likelihood that 
incumbent dealers would use clearinghouses to shut out 
insurgent dealers.260 As a consequence, clearinghouse 
 
256 See In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476, 
2014 WL 4379112, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014). See also Story, supra 
note 88 (reporting that Bank of New York Mellon, MF Global, and State 
Street had been unable to gain admission to the CDS clearinghouses). 
257 See INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, Participants, supra note 178 
(archived pages from June, Aug., Oct., and Dec. 2015 and Feb. 2016) (on 
file with author). On a bi-monthly basis starting from June 2015, the 
author compiled and compared the membership rosters for the major IRS 
and CDS clearinghouses to memorialize the changes. 
258 See INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, ICE Clear Europe Membership, 
supra note 252 (archived pages from June, Aug., Oct., and Dec. 2015 and 
Feb. 2016) (on file with author). ICE Clear Europe members who trade 
only in futures were excluded from this tally. 
259 See SWAPCLEAR, Our Clearing Members, supra note 178 (archived 
pages from June, Aug., Oct., and Dec. 2015 and Feb. 2016) (on file with 
author). On the differences between SwapClear’s U.S.-domiciled and 
global members, see supra notes 252–253. 
260 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 39.12(a)(1) (2016) (product and participant 
eligibility); 17 C.F.R § 39.12(a)(2)(iii) (2016) (minimum capitalization 
requirement capped at $50 million). 
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membership requirements have changed dramatically; 
minimum capitalization requirements, for example, have 
gone from $1 trillion261 to $100 million262 to now $50 
million.263 It is telling, though, that in all this time, the 
membership profile of the major clearinghouses has hardly 
changed. If the members of the major clearinghouses are the 
same institutions that dominate trading, then 
clearinghouses are merely an artifice whose creation by 
regulators might have been well intended but whose 
operation has the unintended effect of cementing the 
dominant dealers’ positions in the downstream markets. 
The mechanisms that dominant dealers have deployed to 
protect their dominance are noteworthy. In re CDS Antitrust 
Litigation teaches that dealers had resorted to naked 
collusion to shut out their competitors. Dealer actions appear 
less interdependent now. Collectively, however, the major 
dealers continue to play an outsized role in setting 
clearinghouse risk standards. The Risk Committee of ICE 
Clear Credit, the clearinghouse at the center of the case, is 
comprised of 12 members, three of whom are independent 
members, and nine of whom are clearinghouse members. 
Presently, the nine insider-members are Bank of America, 
Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citi, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, 
Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, and Morgan Stanley.264 Five of 
 
261 Previously imposed by LCH.Clearnet. See TURING, supra note 118, 
at § 5.6(3); CFTC Roundtable, supra note 22, at 25–26 (statement of Jason 
Kastner, Vice Chairman, Swaps and Derivatives Markets Association). 
262 See ICE CLEAR CREDIT, CLEARING RULES § 201(b)(ii) (2011) (on file 
with author). Previously, ICE Clear Credit’s requirement was $5 billion in 
adjusted net capital. See MF Global Class Action Compl., supra note 99, at 
para. 66, 71. 
263 See, e.g., ICE CLEAR CREDIT, CLEARING RULES § 201(b)(ii) (Mar. 29, 
2016), https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_credit/ICE_Clear_Credit_ 
Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/UMW5-D4JH]. 
264 ICE CLEAR CREDIT, ICE CLEAR CREDIT REGULATION AND 
GOVERNANCE, 3 (Aug. 2015), https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_credi 
t/ICE_Clear_Credit_Regulation_and_Governance.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2
DW-GWPW]. 
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these are the major U.S. dealers; the other four are major 
European dealers. ICE Clear Credit’s Risk Committee is 
reconstituted annually, but the primary criterion for 
membership on the committee is high Participation 
Activities, defined as aggregated volume of trades by 
notional amount.265 Even though ICE Clear Credit has 
promulgated checks on the committee’s authority,266 the 
committee can shape margin requirements, member 
contributions to the guaranty fund, and, even more broadly, 
any “determination” that the clearinghouse makes pursuant 
to its own rules.267 
If the nine dealer-members of ICE Clear Credit’s risk 
management committee arrive independently at policies that 
frustrate the admission of otherwise qualified applicants, 
what then? For all the structural reforms imposed by 
financial regulators and the settlement of In re CDS 
Antitrust Litigation, such denials of access would delay the 
loosening of clearinghouse membership, thereby retaining 
the lock of large dealers on the downstream market as well 
as their cut of lucrative trading revenues for as long as 
possible. As the law stands on monopolization, no recourse is 
available. 
Understandably, the major dealers should play some role 
in shaping clearinghouse policies since they bear the brunt of 
risk from derivatives trading.268 After all, notionals are 
concentrated in the top dealers, who likely post more 
collateral and contribute more to the guaranty fund than 
 
265 See ICE CLEAR CREDIT CLEARING RULE 503(a)(vi) (“Composition of 
the Risk Committee”) (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ 
clear_credit/ICE_Clear_Credit_Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9RX-29GM]. 
266 See, e.g., id. at Rule 501 (stating that the ICE Clear Credit Board 
not obligated to abide by the Risk Committee’s recommendations). ICE, 
too, is at the mercy of the dealers. Because dealers have cornered the lion’s 
share of CDS notionals, ICE ensures long-term survival by aligning with 
the dealers more than it would by admitting more members. 
267 See id. at Rules 502, 615. 
268 See ICE CLEAR CREDIT REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 
264, at 2. 
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smaller dealers. Because clearinghouses work to mutualize 
risk, they must ensure that membership is restricted to well-
capitalized and well-run institutions that can weather the 
shock of another member’s default. It must also be conceded 
that the outsized role of large dealers in the downstream 
market is to be expected, given the risks associated with 
market-making for derivatives.269 Yet those risks may have 
been attendant in the markets’ early years; today, 
transparency from the indexing of IRS and CDS and the 
injection of liquidity from higher trading volumes have 
greatly mitigated those concerns.270 As to the control over 
clearinghouses wielded by large dealers, it is altogether too 
easy for incumbent members to hide behind risk mitigation 
justifications for exclusionary practices.271 More importantly, 
risk mutualization works best among diverse parties, so a 
one-dimensional clearinghouse membership profile can end 
up transmitting, rather than dissipating, systemic risk.272 
Finally, the trends in the OTC derivatives markets at 
inception are less relevant today. How the large dealers 
behave now, in the face of market and regulatory 
transformations, can subject them to renewed antitrust 
scrutiny. The evidence above suggests that the dealers are 
 
269 In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476, 2014 
WL 4379112, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014); CDS Antitrust Litig. Markit 
Mem., supra note 95, at 5–6. 
270 See In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *1–2. IRS 
and CDS markets differ somewhat. IRS moved earlier toward index 
trading and central clearing than CDS. See SwapClear History, 
SWAPCLEAR, http://www.swapclear.com/why/swapclear-history.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZUU3-PDHB] (last visited Dec. 31, 2016); Credit 
Derivatives, supra note 153; MARKIT, MARKIT CREDIT INDICES: A PRIMER 7 
(2008), https://www.markit.com/news/Credit%20Indices%20Primer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/82YB-N5GT]. Whether as a result of these trends or not, 
SwapClear has more members than either of the ICE clearinghouses. See 
supra note 178. Of course, the IRS trading market is far larger, covering 
referent currencies around the world. See BIS, 2014 OTC DERIVATIVES 
STATISTICS, supra note 148, at 2–6. 
271 Chang, supra note 14, at 85–86. 
272 See infra Section IV.C. 
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acting to keep rivals out of the clearinghouses, albeit acting 
independently without coordination. The dealers certainly 
have the market power to do so, and the clearinghouses have 
the market power to facilitate exclusion. 
The attention lavished by this Section upon the market 
definition/market share paradigm may seem unnecessary 
and even old-fashioned by today’s standards. Over the last 
few decades, antitrust has become comfortable enough with 
inferring market power from anticompetitive effects that 
market definition/market share need not be the gauge of 
market power.273 Nevertheless, this Article opts for the 
traditional approach (and, consequently, a long Section on 
market power) because the ultimate goal is different than a 
re-examination of market definition—it is to push Section 2 
jurisprudence toward recognizing shared monopoly, so as to 
redress parallel exclusion. In the service of that goal, this 
Article aims to head off any criticism over the rigor of its 
analysis of market power. While market definition provides 
the ancillary benefit of highlighting blind spots in financial 
regulation,274 its major benefit is to preempt the distracting 
arguments that would have flowed from going straight to 
anticompetitive effects. 
IV.  HARMS OF PARALLEL EXCLUSION 
Plaintiffs cannot prevail against an exclusionary scheme 
unless the scheme’s anticompetitive effects outweigh its 
enhanced efficiencies.275 This Section evaluates the harms of 
parallel exclusion from three perspectives: competition 
(Section IV.A), consumers (Section IV.B), and systemic risk 
 
273 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). See also Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1237 (“The status of 
monopoly power could be inferred from the effects of the conduct.”). 
274 For a summary, see supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text. 
275 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 5.4b2, at 298; Hemphill & Wu, supra 
note 6, at 1237–38. 
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(Section IV.C), and leaves the benefits and balancing to 
Section V. 
Others have explored the effects of concentration in the 
derivatives markets.276 Thus, this Section connects this 
Article to other scholarly trends. One trend is the burgeoning 
idea that competition and systemic risk are dueling 
interests, which is a variation of the old banking debate over 
whether competition enhances stability.277 Another trend is a 
recent pivot to antitrust for solutions to problems in 
finance—for example, how financial intermediaries impede 
transparency and efficiency.278 Channeling the malleability 
that scholars see in antitrust, this Section frames “harms” 
broadly so as to encompass not only anticompetitive effects 
but also negative effects on the health of the financial 
system.279  
A.  Harm to Competition 
Exclusionary schemes harm competition. Under the 
theories of leveraging and foreclosure, the dominance of a 
firm in one market (e.g., an airport or a clearinghouse) can 
be parlayed into dominance in another market (commercial 
air traffic or derivatives trading) if there is sufficient nexus 
 
276 See, e.g., Chang, supra note 14, at 73; Greenberger, supra note 21, 
at 252; Litan, supra note 189, at 22; Turbeville, supra note 21, at 6. 
277 See Thorsten Beck, Olivier De Jonghe & Glenn Schepens, Bank 
Competition and Stability: Cross-Country Heterogeneity, 22 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 218, 218–219 (2013); Iftekhar Hasan & Matej Marinc, 
Should Competition Policy in Banking Be Amended During Crises? 
Lessons from the EU, EUR. J.L. ECON. 295, 296, 308–17 (2013). 
278 See Judge, supra note 77, at 626; see also Jonathan R. Macey & 
James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust 
Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1403–08, 1417–18 
(2011) ; Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a 
Model for Breaking up the Banks that Are Too-Big-to-Fail?, 62 HASTINGS 
L.J. 821, 827 (2011). 
279 Of course, this proposition must contend with the antitrust injury 
standing requirement. See infra notes 324–327 and accompanying text. 
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between the two markets.280 Leveraging and foreclosure 
work all the better if one market is controlled by a natural 
monopoly that is indispensable to an adjacent market, and 
the dominant firms in the adjacent market direct the natural 
monopoly.281 
In derivatives markets, the anticompetitive effects of 
convergence in clearing and trading are not theoretical, but 
real. Contemporaneous with In re CDS Antitrust Litigation, 
the brokerage firm MF Global commenced an action against 
virtually the same set of defendants for cornering the CDS 
trading market by restricting access to ICE Clear Credit.282 
In re CDS Antitrust Litigation itself shows how large dealers 
allegedly forestalled the development of exchanges and 
alternative clearinghouses, innovations that would have 
moved the CDS market more quickly along its trajectory 
toward transparency and efficiency.283 
Consolidation and settlement of the cases brought about 
certain reforms—for example, commitment by ICE to build 
an open-access, anonymous CDS trading platform similar to 
 
280 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 348–49; Rey & Tirole, supra 
note 3, at 2153–58, 2194. For criticisms, see Richard S. Markovits, Tie-ins, 
Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory Part II: Tie-ins, Leverage, and the 
American Antitrust Laws, 80 YALE L.J. 195 (1970); Richard A. Posner, The 
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 929 (1979). 
281 With a natural monopoly, market power in at least one market is 
assured. From this was borne the essential facilities doctrine. See Stephen 
M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Essential Facilities Doctrine: The 
Lost Message of Terminal Railroad 2–4 (UC Berkeley Pub. L Research 
Paper No. 2407071, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2407071 [https://perma.cc/4WNW-J5ZY]. Detractors of this doctrine 
are numerous and eminent. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: 
An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 841 
(1990); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND 
EXECUTION 237 (2005); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, L.L.P. 540 U.S. 398, 399 (2004). 
282 See MF Global Complaint, supra note 99, at 1–3. 
283 See supra text accompanying notes 83–88. 
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an exchange.284 Fortuitously, the platform appears to 
replicate the exchange that the large dealers had driven to 
the ground, in a move that became the basis for suit.285 On 
the surface, the new platform almost certainly spells the 
demise of dealer dominance—once the venture gets off the 
ground.286 In a strange twist, however, the platform’s success 
depends on widespread adoption of central clearing.287 This 
is because central clearing provides independent assurance 
of creditworthiness, without which no trader would agree to 
transact with an anonymous counterparty.288 Yet dominant 
dealers control ICE Clear Credit’s risk committee, who are 
loath to see the platform take off. Even if it does succeed, the 
platform would only operate for one type of CDS, leaving 
more complex types of CDS still within the province of large 
dealers.289 
It remains to be seen whether ICE Clear Credit’s dealer-
dominated risk committee will embrace the trading platform 
or instead find ways of obstructing and delaying the 
platform’s implementation. If the latter transpires, then one 
casualty will be innovation. While denying rival dealers 
access to ICE Clear Credit inhibits competition in the dealer 
markets, blocking an alternate trading platform prevents a 
 
284 As a result of settlement, ISDA also announced its intention to 
make its decision-making processes more inclusive. See Decl. of Darrell 
Duffie in Support of Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Approval of Settlement at para. 
9, 13–14, In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-02476, 
2016 WL 2731524 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2016), 2015 WL 6869070; Mike 
Kentz, ICE Plans Single-name CDS Platform, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2015 
1:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/31/markets-derivatives-
cds-idUKL1N1161A520150831 [https://perma.cc/Z2PM-7G73]. 
285 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
286 The platform is all-to-all and anonymous, which means that 
buyers and sellers transact with one another much like on an exchange, 
without having to go through the closed and opaque intermediary of 
dealers. See Kentz, supra note 284. 
287 See Kentz, supra note 284. 
288 Id. 
289 That is, single-name CDS. See id.; see also supra note 143. 
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seismic transformation that could upend the dealer model 
altogether. Of course, innovation—in particular, disruptive 
innovation—is often a tradeoff for the stability of natural 
monopolies; where a natural monopoly facilitates parallel 
exclusion, innovation is sure to suffer alongside price.290 
Competition and innovation can be ethereal concepts. To 
crystallize the harms of parallel exclusion, we must also 
identify who is harmed. The vast majority of derivatives 
dealers are not members of SwapClear, ICE Clear Credit, or 
ICE Clear Europe.291 This includes State Street and Bank of 
New York (“BNY”) Mellon, the eighth and ninth largest 
BHCs, respectively, as well as predecessors of the sizeable 
brokerage firms MF Global and Newedge, all of whom 
previously failed to join ICE Clear Credit.292 Exclusion from 
the clearinghouses primarily harms this set of dealers by 
suppressing their trade revenues; they can satisfy the 
 
290 On parallel exclusion’s capacity to harm price and innovation, see 
Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1185, 1210–12. 
291 See SWAPCLEAR, Our Clearing Members, supra note 178; 
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, Participants, supra note 178; 
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, ICE Clear Europe Membership, supra note 
252. Citi, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Bank of America, and Morgan 
Stanley are members of all three clearinghouses. Affiliates of HSBC are as 
well, but HSBC is a financial conglomerate headquartered outside the 
United States. Wells Fargo, however, is a U.S.-based entity that, 
anomalously, belongs to SwapClear and ICE Clear Credit. But Wells 
Fargo is also a traditional commercial bank—and a goliath at that. Its 
commercial bank subsidiary is the fourth largest in the United States, 
with assets of well over $1 trillion. See OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 
76, at tbl.1. Perhaps its forays into the IRS and CDS markets are the 
result of leveraging (by way of tying) that dominance as a purveyor of 
credit. 
292 See Story, supra note 88. MF Global would eventually sue the 
large dealers before going defunct. See MF Global Complaint, supra note 
99, at 1. Newedge, having merged into Société Générale, is on SwapClear. 
See Daniel P. Collins, New Day for Newedge, Or Should We Say SocGen?, 
Futures Mag. (July 11, 2014) http://www.futuresmag.com/2014/07/11/new-
day-newedge-or-should-we-say-socgen [https://perma.cc/R3R5-5UJC]; 
SWAPCLEAR, Our Clearing Members, supra note 178. 
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central clearing mandate only by paying to access 
clearinghouses through the current members.293 
Focusing on competitors skews our impression of the 
stakes, though, as a fight between trillionaires and 
billionaires. Each of the five dominant dealers holds just 
under or well over $1 trillion in assets, while State Street 
and BNY Mellon wield hundreds of billions.294 This is, in 
reductionist terms, a conflict between big banks and colossal 
banks, or hedge funds and colossal banks, in which neither 
side tends to arouse sympathies. For this reason, the 
remainder of the Section examines the effects of parallel 
exclusion on consumers and systemic risk, so as to paint a 
more holistic picture. It is also helpful to bear in mind the 
ultimate detriments of distorted competition: higher prices 
and less innovation.295 
B. Harm to Consumers 
Parallel exclusion in derivatives markets both inflates 
prices for financial products and reduces their availability.296 
Consequently, end-users of derivatives must pay more or 
 
293 In the first quarter of 2016 alone, the top four commercial banks 
generated a combined $2.815 billion in trading revenue from interest rate 
positions (over 91.7% of revenues for the entire market) and $305 million 
from credit positions (over 91.3%). See OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 
76, at tbl.7. 
294 Id. Again, Wells Fargo is an outlier: as the lone trillionaire which 
holds membership to some clearinghouses but is not active in derivatives 
trading, its bread and butter is lending. 
295 On this point, the maxim that “antitrust protects competition, not 
competitors” is helpful. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 
320 (1962). This has been taken to mean, among other things, that injury 
to “‘a single competitor, standing alone, does not prove [the] 
anticompetitive effect’ necessary to establish antitrust injury.” HCI 
Technologies, Inc. v. Avaya, Inc., 241 F. App’x 115, 123 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Military Servs. Realty, Inc. v. Realty Consultants of Va., 823 F.2d 
829, 832 (4th Cir. 1987)). 
296 See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77 
ANTITRUST L.J. 343, 353–55 (2011). 
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forego hedging options altogether.297 Thus, customers bear a 
higher cost. 
Because existing literature has already examined these 
possibilities for the derivatives markets,298 this Section 
canvasses them below. In short, this line of analysis unfolds 
according to traditional antitrust principles, which hold that 
exclusion constricts consumption by raising prices.299 
By countering exclusion and price inflation, the law spurs 
increased consumption of financial instruments whose 
valuations can fluctuate wildly.300 Such a prospect might be 
unsettling given the history of scandals and crises associated 
with derivatives trading.301 But then, antitrust is indifferent 
about the fallout of increased consumption.302 Its balancing 
of harms and benefits tends to revolve around an economic 
vision of consumer welfare—specifically, whether consumers 
are paying supracompetitive prices.303 In fact, where natural 
 
297 See Story, supra note 88 (“Pension funds today use derivatives to 
hedge investments. States and cities use them to try to hold down 
borrowing costs. Airlines use them to secure steady fuel prices. Food 
companies use them to lock in prices of commodities like wheat or beef.”). 
298 See Chang, supra note 14, at 84–85. 
299 In the context of parallel exclusion, see Hemphill & Wu, supra 
note 6, at 1210. 
300 See Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 337–73. 
301 Notable examples are Orange County, Jefferson County, the City 
of Detroit, Procter & Gamble, AIG, Lehman Brothers, and of course the 
financial crisis. See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND 
RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 53-57, 115-22, (2003); 
Congressman Spencer T. Bachus, Federal Policy Responses to the 
Predicament of Municipal Finance, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 759 (2009); Henny 
Sender & Stephen Foley, Details of Detroit’s Troubles Come to Light, FIN. 
TIMES (Jul. 25, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/50a4250e-f53f-11e2-b4f8-
00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/MVK3-F6SX]; FDIC, The Orderly 
Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. under the Dodd-Frank Act, 
5 FDIC Q. no. 2, 2011, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2011 
_vol5_2/lehman.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YH8-NSK7].  
302 See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
303 See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal 
of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE 
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monopolies serve as gatekeepers to public goods, antitrust 
does not even care whether public goods are actually good for 
the public. Thus, curtailing parallel exclusion means that 
financial regulators must step up their game in protecting 
consumers.304 
Concrete examples help to explicate this point. Today, 
Southwest Airlines is one of the four largest commercial air 
carriers in the country. However, Southwest began as a 
small carrier in Texas, operating purely intra-state to avoid 
federal regulation.305 Two larger, federally regulated carriers 
sued to enjoin Southwest’s operations but lost.306 For 
passengers, Southwest has revolutionized air travel, in 
particular by eschewing the hub-and-spoke method of 
operation and introducing consumers to discount, no-frills 
airfare.307 By comparison, the major IRS and CDS 
clearinghouses have yet to accommodate the entry of 
smaller, more nimble dealers who do not fit the profile of 
dominant dealers in the U.S. markets.308 If more diverse 
 
DAME L. REV. 191, 196 (2008) (“The primary goal of antitrust is to protect 
consumers from paying higher prices to firms that have unfairly gained or 
maintained market power.”). 
304 For one example of such protections, see 17 C.F.R. § 23.440(c) 
(2015); Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9783 (Feb. 17, 2012). 
Of course, clearing and standardization of derivatives help as well, by 
ensuring that trades are adequately collateralized and products are not 
too illiquid or strange. 
305 See Tex. Int’l Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 473 F.2d 1150, 
1151 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
306 Id. 
307 Other innovations include frequent flyer programs for customers 
and profit-sharing programs for employees. See History of Southwest 
Airlines, AVIATION ONLINE MAG., http://avstop.com/history/historyfairlines/ 
southwest.html [https://perma.cc/4ETA-GR5Q]. 
308 That is, having approximately $1 trillion in assets, dominating 
across multiple types of derivatives, and having been a derivatives 
market-maker from the very beginning. See Katy Burne, Citadel Makes 
Inroads into Swaps Arena, WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2015 8:07 PM), 
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members are permitted to join, then price reductions and 
innovations for consumers will follow. 
Of course, if that happens, then the current dealers are 
likely to pull back from the market. There are indications 
that this is beginning to happen. Deutsche Bank has 
apparently decided to forego trading in certain types of 
CDS.309 Since 2008, CDS trading volumes have steadily 
declined.310 As derivatives become less bespoke, they 
command a less supracompetitive premium. 
C. Harm to Systemic Risk 
Opening up the pool of clearinghouse members diversifies 
the dealer markets, which has the added benefit of 
dissipating risk. The risks associated with OTC derivatives 
are multifaceted and played a major role in the financial 
crisis.311 Regulators proposed clearinghouses as one pathway 
to dissipate risk by having a pool of members mutualize, or 
share, the risk;312 however, this process works best when 
clearinghouse membership is reasonably diverse.313 In the 
dominant IRS and CDS clearinghouses, diversification has 




309 See Stephanie Ruhle & Sridhar Natarajan, Deutsche Bank Exits 








311 See, e.g., FDIC, The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers, 
supra note 301. 
312 CFTC, DCO General Provisions, supra note 28, at 69,415. 
313 “Reasonably” because open access must still be balanced against a 
clearinghouse’s prerogative to screen members for risk. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 39.12(a)(1)(i), (iii) (2016). 
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rivals, thereby perpetuating the concentration of both 
notionals and risk within a small circle.314 Recognizing this 
propensity to exclusion, financial regulators have crafted 
rules governing clearinghouses that include mandating open 
access for dealers and restricting high capitalization 
requirements for members.315 Tellingly, in announcing the 
promulgation of one set of rules, the CFTC suggested that 
concentration and systemic risk are intertwined and that if 
more firms join clearinghouses, both sets of concerns will 
diminish.316 
Conflating concentration and systemic risk—and thereby 
intertwining antitrust and financial regulation—is not 
without precedent. Recently, corporate and finance legal 
scholars have proposed using antitrust to counter the self-
entrenching impulse of financial intermediaries;317 to set a 
threshold for liabilities that financial institutions can amass 
(so as to pre-empt public bailout and the too-big-to-fail 
phenomenon, or “TBTF”);318 to more precisely define TBTF 
by correlating it with monopoly power;319 and to curtail 
systemic risk by preventing the tying of swaps to loans.320 
Nevertheless, these are odd ways of conceptualizing 
antitrust. Just as antitrust does not care whether “public 
goods” are actually “good for the public,” antitrust doctrine 
likely does not change to accommodate ancillary benefits 
that are far outside its traditional focus. In other words, 
before we can turn to antitrust for guidance, we must define 
 
314 See supra note 277–278 and accompanying text. 
315 See 17 C.F.R. § 39.12(a)(1), (a)(2)(iii) (2016). 
316 See CFTC, DCO General Provisions, supra note 28, at 69,355 
(stating that a $50 million capitalization requirement for members will 
increase the number of firms clearing swaps, which will make markets 
more competitive, increase liquidity, reduce concentration, and reduce 
systemic risk). 
317 Judge, supra note 77, at 639. 
318 Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 278, at 1374. 
319 Sharon E. Foster, Systemic Financial-Service Institutions and 
Monopoly Power, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 357, 359 (2011). 
320 Chang, supra note 194. 
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the goals of antitrust, which is an endeavor rife with pitfalls 
and disagreement. 
There is some consensus that consumer welfare is 
important.321 Beyond economic goals, academics disagree 
intensely over whether antitrust accommodates social and 
political goals, such as dissipating the political power that 
concentrated industries wield.322 All in all, financial stability 
and systemic risk seem to be too far beyond the scope of even 
liberal constructions of antitrust goals.323 
Further complicating any attempt to synchronize 
competition and finance goals is the antitrust injury rule,324 
a requirement imposed upon private litigants to prove 
 
321 Though, of course, the definition of consumer welfare varies wildly. 
Cf. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 107–15 (1978); Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 303, at 196; Alan J. 
Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and 
Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 660–61, 670–71 (2010). 
322 Cf. David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1219–24 (1988); David W. Barnes, Nonefficiency 
Goals in the Antitrust Law of Mergers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 787, 806, 
809–28 (1989); Meese, supra note 321, at 664; ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING 
CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW 29–48 (2015). 
323 On the imprecise correlation between antitrust and TBTF, see 
Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 465 (2011) 
(“Restricting bigness may mitigate systemic risk, but doing so by no means 
eliminates it because systemic risk is not solely a function of size.”); Barak 
Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 605, 651 (2012) (“[T]he antitrust methodology examines 
whether markets are functioning competitively, but it has no tools to 
explore whether a financial institution is too big or too systematically 
significant to fail.”). 
324 The rule is the last of a three-part inquiry, whereby plaintiffs must 
show (i) an injury, (ii) caused by the violation of antitrust laws, (iii) that 
qualifies as an antitrust injury. HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 16.3a1, at 
808. See also Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983) (“[C]ongress did not intend the 
antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might 
conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation.”) (quoting Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972)). 
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“injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to 
prevent . . . .”325 The antitrust injury rule has operated as a 
check on private antitrust actions for decades.326 It was 
invoked in In re CDS Antitrust Litigation as well, though 
without success.327 
The above realities mean that a dealer that is excluded 
from the IRS or CDS clearinghouses cannot invoke the 
concentration of systemic risk as an injury in itself. When it 
comes to the weighing of anticompetitive effects and 
enhanced efficiencies, systemic risk almost certainly plays no 
role. At most, plaintiffs can hope for a nod to systemic risk as 
one of a broad class of harms implicated by concentration in 
the dealer markets, which can—but need not necessarily—be 
considered by the court or regulator. 
Current scholarly trends do give some hope to the 
possibility of accounting for systemic risk. While corporate 
and finance law scholars challenge their traditional 
paradigms, antitrust scholars are also undergoing 
introspection. Some question how competition policy could 
have permitted financial institutions to amass so much 
power.328 Others question the relevance of antitrust if it 
cannot deal with the political and social fallout of 
concentration in the financial markets.329 While curtailing 
systemic risk has no formal place in the current rubric of 
 
325 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 
(1977) (“The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the 
violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.”). 
326 See, e.g., Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 519; Cargill, Inc. v. 
Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 113 (1986). 
327 No. 13-MD-2476, 2014 WL 4379112, at *7 (Sept. 4, 2014). 
328 See Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 557, 558–60 (2010). 
329 Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 551, 624 (2012) (“Antitrust’s current objectives of promoting 
consumer welfare and efficiency are poorly defined. . . . The quest 
distanced antitrust from important policy issues (such as systemic risk) 
and rendered antitrust less relevant. Consequently, now is the time to 
reconsider antitrust’s political, social, and moral concerns.”). 
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exclusion, it is drawing attention as a noteworthy 
consequence of more rigorous application of antitrust law. 
V. OFFSETTING BENEFITS 
This Section examines how the benefits of parallel 
exclusion offset, in whole or in part, any resulting harms to 
the derivatives markets. The Section begins conventionally, 
with enhanced efficiencies. For parity with this Article’s 
comprehensive approach to harms, this Section also 
evaluates the argument that narrowing the pool of dealers 
and clearinghouse members mitigates risk. Finally, this 
Section provides a framework for balancing. 
A. Enhanced Efficiencies 
Dealer control over clearinghouses can minimize 
transaction costs and eliminate double markups—i.e., one 
set of fees being charged for clearing and another set for 
execution (trading).330 This argument is most pertinent to 
vertically integrated clearinghouses, where the provider of 
execution services actually owns the clearinghouse. In such 
instances, the derivatives consumer need only transact 
once—with the market-maker, who can then procure 
clearing without having to undergo another round of 
bargaining. This saves the consumer the trouble of 
independently searching out a clearinghouse, as well as 
incurring separate fees for clearing.331 
Clearing and execution are apt for integration because 
the services complement each other so well: unless an 
exception applies, a trade cannot be fully executed without 
being cleared. Bringing both spheres under common 
ownership minimizes the impulse of each constituent 
 
330 Craig Pirrong, Clearing Up Misconceptions on Clearing, 31 REG. 
22, 25 (2008). 
331 See id. at 24–25. 
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provider to inflate its prices and externalize the impact of 
markups to the complementary provider.332 
Technically, however, IRS and CDS clearinghouses are 
not vertically integrated. SwapClear is owned and operated 
by a subsidiary of LCH.Clearnet Group Ltd., a U.K. 
company.333 LCH.Clearnet Group is majority owned (57%) by 
the London Stock Exchange Group, with the remainder 
owned by its members and other exchanges.334 ICE Clear 
Credit and ICE Clear Europe are owned and operated by 
ICE; these entities, too, are not majority-owned by the 
downstream dealers.335 To be sure, vertical integration does 
abound in the derivatives world, particularly for exchange-
traded products.336 With OTC IRS and CDS, however, the 
 
332 See id. at 25. 
333 See SwapClear History, supra note 270; Company Structure, 
LCH.CLEARNET, http://www.lchclearnet.com/en/about-us/company-
structure [https://perma.cc/Q6VV-JS9J] (last visited Dec. 31, 2016). 
334 About Us, LCH.CLEARNET, http://www.lchclearnet.com/en/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/9CKC-QDQ4] (last visited Dec. 31, 2016). 
335 See Intercontinental Exch., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 50 
(Mar. 30, 2015). When ICE purchased The Clearing Corporation (“TCC”) 
to launch its first CDS clearinghouse, see supra note 95, the venture was 
structured around a Cayman Islands exempted limited partnership with 
two classes of limited partners: one class of interests was held by ICE and 
its affiliates, and the other class of interests was held by shareholders of 
TCC, with profits split evenly between the two classes. See ICE & TCC, 
Request for Exemption from Certain Provisions of the U.S. Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933 with Respect to 
Cleared Credit Default Swaps 7 (Feb. 26, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
exorders/2009/ice-trust-exreq.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3FB-ZRDR]. The TCC 
shareholders were affiliates of Bank of America, Barclays, Citi, Credit 
Suisse, Creditext Group, Deutsche Bank, GFInet Inc., Goldman Sachs, 
ICAP Securities, LabMorgan Corp., Markit, MF Global, Morgan Stanley, 
UBS, and U.S. Exchange Holdings, Inc. Id. at 9 n.9. 
336 CME Group, for instance, owns and operates proprietary 
clearinghouses that only clear products sold on CME exchanges. For 
criticisms, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTS BEFORE THE DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, supra note 28, at 10–11. In Europe, clearing and execution silos 
dot the derivatives landscape. For criticisms, see Mike Reece, Competition 
or Consolidation?: The Outlook for Interoperability Among European 
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upstream and downstream markets coalesce not by common 
ownership, but by the control that downstream players exert 
as members of the upstream facility. Thus, the mechanisms 
of exclusion proceed slightly differently.337 
In theory, then, because clearinghouses are not majority-
owned by dealers, customers cannot automatically avoid 
extra transaction costs and double markups. The majority 
owners of clearinghouses may well decide to pursue 
supracompetitive pricing. Yet transactional and pricing 
efficiencies still hold in practice because the major dealers, 
as clearinghouse members, will have negotiated ex ante for 
clearing services and factored clearing prices into the overall 
cost of execution charged to end-users. Currently, the costs of 
clearing are fairly low and continue to decline.338 This pricing 
 






337 With parallel exclusion, a group of dealers are acting 
independently, rather than one exchange refusing to allow its 
clearinghouse to clear products on a rival exchange. 
338 For the example of securities clearing by NSCC, see Crystal 
Bueno, More Transparency on Clearing Costs, DTCC CORPORATE 
NEWSLETTER (Aug. 2009), http://164.109.172.95/news/newsletters/dtcc/2009 
/aug/clearing_cost_transparency.php [https://perma.cc/XED2-JLZ9]. Simi-
lar pricing information is harder to obtain for the IRS and CDS 
clearinghouses, which have a shorter history. However, on efforts to 
increase transparency for the industry, see, for example, Stan Ivanov & 
Lee Underwood, CDS Clearing at ICE: A Unique Methodology, FUTURES 
INDUS., Nov. 2011, at 31, https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_credit/ 
FIA_magazine_CDS_risk_management_article.pdf [https://perma.cc/T562-
KUQP]; Order Granting Temporary Exemptions under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 in Connection with Request on Behalf of ICE Clear 
Europe Limited Related to Central Clearing of Credit Default Swaps, SEC 
Interpretive Letter, 2009 WL 10477350 17 (July 23, 2009), https://www. 
sec.gov/rules/exorders/2009/34-60372.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3FB-ZRDR] 
(pricing transparency a condition for relief for ICE Clear Europe from 
temporary registration). 
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structure may be less a result of vertical integration or 
dealer control than the clearing functionality itself. Clearing 
is a regulated process in a highly regulated industry.339 If the 
industry were to charge excessive prices, then the central 
clearing mandate would be eviscerated, drawing even more 
intense regulatory scrutiny. The closest analog to the 
industry is, again, that of an infrastructure or public utility 
operating at close to cost (e.g., an airport); the fear of 
anticompetitive effects arises not so much from the utility 
itself but from the self-serving impulses of those who direct 
the utility, particularly if they also hold a dominant stake in 
an adjacent market (e.g., airlines). 
B. Credit Risk Mitigation 
An additional justification of exclusion, one based not on 
antitrust but on finance, is that restricting clearinghouse 
membership to large, well-capitalized institutions reduces 
counterparty credit risk—that is, the risk that one party to a 
trade might default.340 After all, the charge of clearinghouses 
was to reduce systemic risk in the OTC derivatives markets, 
and keeping out smaller and riskier traders can help achieve 
that goal.341 Clearinghouses therefore possess the 
prerogative to set risk standards.342 Arguably, large dealers 
should steer this standard-setting process, since they best 
understand the risks not only of derivatives but also of 
diversifying the trading markets. As the dominant sellers of 
derivatives instruments and go-to institutions for offsetting 
derivatives positions, large dealers hold most of a market’s 
derivatives notionals. In any given market, large dealers are 
ubiquitous counterparties. By extension, they also shoulder 
most of the market’s credit risk. Rightfully, then, large 
 
339 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Title VIII, 12 U.S.C. § 5461 (2015) et seq. 
340 See Feder, supra note 17, at 689, 722–27. 
341 See CFTC Roundtable, supra note 22, at 66–67 (comments of 
Roger Liddell, LCH ClearNet Group). 
342 See id. at 15–16 (comments of Jonathan Short, ICE Trust U.S.). 
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dealers should play a significant role in setting 
clearinghouse standards.343 
Prior to the central clearing mandate, credit risk and 
systemic risk were closely linked. Counterparties in an OTC 
derivatives trade had to bilaterally clear the trade, which 
meant that each side bore the risk that the other might not 
honor contractual obligations.344 Because large dealers were 
directly connected to far more counterparties than smaller 
dealers, large dealers also assumed more credit risk. This 
degree of interconnectivity made large dealers systemically 
risky. For example, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 
2008 jeopardized not only its multitude of trading 
counterparties but also the entire financial system.345 
Lehman’s default on derivatives trades could have triggered 
those counterparties to default on other obligations.346 Thus, 
Dodd-Frank not only created a system for the orderly 
liquidation of systemically significant financial 
institutions,347 it also required derivatives trades to be 
centrally overseen and effectively guaranteed by 
clearinghouses.348 With the central clearing mandate, 
lawmakers and regulators ostensibly prioritized credit risk 
 
343 See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
344 For a nuanced comparison of bilateral and central clearing, see 
Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and 
Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 91–93 (2011). 
345 See FDIC, The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers, supra 
note 301, at 1. 
346 See id. at 8 (“A complex, systemic financial company can hold very 
large positions in qualified financial contracts, often involving numerous 
counterparties and back-to-back trades, some of which may be opaque and 
incompletely documented. A disorderly unwinding of such contracts . . . 
can have severe negative consequences for the financial company, its 
creditors, its counterparties, and the financial stability of the United 
States.”). 
347 12 U.S.C. § 5383, 5386, 5390 (2012). 
348 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(a)(1) (2012); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 8302(d)(1) (2012). 
CHANG – FINAL  
No. 3:657] SECOND-GENERATION MONOPOLIZATION 735 
 
and systemic risk mitigation above all other concerns, 
including competition. 
Caveats and counterarguments to the credit risk 
justification abound. The markets’ embrace of 
standardization and transparency have alleviated some of 
the credit risk concerns.349 The clearing functionality in 
particular has greatly reduced the credit risks borne by large 
dealers, who now novate their positions to clearinghouses.350 
Risk is best mitigated when dispersed across a diverse pool 
of members, but thus far, the IRS and CDS clearinghouses 
have not significantly opened up.351 Ultimately, 
clearinghouses cede too much of their risk management 
discretion to entities clouded by strong incentives to keep 
trading and execution closed off to competitors.352 
C.  Weighing the Harms Against the Benefits 
Given the multitude of issues implicated by parallel 
exclusion in derivatives markets, how should its harms be 
compared against its benefits? To prevent the balancing 
framework from becoming too unwieldy, the exclusion 
analysis could be restricted to traditional antitrust concerns 
such as anticompetitive effects, consumer welfare, and 
enhanced efficiencies.353 Within this rubric, this Article 
asserts that the anticompetitive effects of parallel exclusion 
in derivatives markets, along with the harms to consumers, 
outweigh the efficiencies. The propensity of large dealers to 
sustain a wide bid/ask spread is too well-documented,354 and 
the setbacks to innovation too significant,355 to be offset by 
 
349 See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
350 See Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and 
Systemic Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to 
Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49, 65–66 (2011). 
351 See supra notes 251–254 and 257–259 and accompanying text. 
352 See Chang, supra note 14, at 97. 
353 See supra notes 35, 55. 
354 See supra Section II.B. 
355 See supra Section IV.B. 
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efficiencies that rest upon dubious assumptions.356 In sum, 
this scheme should not be permitted to continue. 
What animates this Article, however, is the aim of 
infusing the exclusion rubric with an awareness of financial 
risk. To that end, this Section contemplated systemic risk 
exacerbation as a harm of parallel exclusion and credit risk 
mitigation as a benefit. Considered in tandem, systemic risk 
is exacerbated—by keeping clearinghouse membership 
closed and the dealer oligopoly impermeable—far more than 
credit risk mitigated by virtue of the same behavior. This 
tips the scales even more dramatically against parallel 
exclusion. 
However, accounting for extra-antitrust concerns such as 
financial risk may further muddle an already confused 
framework. The assessment of market power has been 
fraught with controversy, and anticompetitive effects and 
efficiencies have been subjected to similarly intense debate 
over antitrust’s objectives. Piling on financial risk will not 
simplify the enforcer’s task of weighing the harms and the 
gains.357 If anything, it vitiates an institutional design that 
has partitioned competition and financial stability as 
competences for antitrust and financial regulators, 
respectively.358 
 
356 See supra notes 330–339 and accompanying text. 
357 For an especially poignant description of the quandary, see 
RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 6 (2013) (“What is 
reasonable or sensible will often depend on moral feelings, common sense, 
sympathies, and other ingredients of thought and feeling that can’t readily 
be translated into a weighing of measurable consequences.”). Due perhaps 
to the complexity of its substance, antitrust has had a history of 
obfuscating procedure. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
547–48 (2007) (pleadings); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 576–77 (1986) (summary judgment). 
358 The boundaries are somewhat fluid though. Financial regulators 
are empowered to consider the effects upon competition in their 
rulemaking. The literature on regulatory capture proffers antitrust as a 
countermeasure to wrest control from interested regulators. 
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The current institutional design need not be sacrosanct. 
The failure of both sets of regulators to head off the financial 
crisis suggests that the regulatory design is too rigid to 
anticipate and correct for its own blind spots.359 This track 
record does not bode well for the OTC derivatives markets. 
Even if monopolization jurisprudence develops to the point of 
curtailing parallel exclusion, today’s dominant dealers will 
exit the markets, and new hedging strategies will arise in 
the interstices between financial regulation and antitrust.360 
After all, derivatives themselves were innovations 
responding to the desire of end-users to transfer or modulate 
market risks in novel ways.361 
Market definition, however, may offer a way of thwarting 
the possibility that new alternatives to derivatives will 
precipitate another crisis. Anticipating substitute products is 
a key part of market definition; antitrust regularly contends 
with competing narratives about substitutability and cross-
elasticities in drawing the relevant market.362 Financial 
regulators, however, are often slow to predict the 
unregulated spaces that regulated firms turn to.363 By 
 
359 For example, as traditional financial intermediaries faced 
heightened regulation, risk functions were outsourced to less regulated 
intermediaries in the capital markets. Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing 
Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16–20 (2010); Kathryn Judge, 
Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and 
Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 665–67 (2012). Astonishingly, even 
where change has been slow and incremental, regulators have failed to 
exhibit the imagination necessary to rein in the unintended consequences. 
See, e.g., Omarova, supra note 225, at 1041–42. 
360 See supra note 309. 
361 See Hu, supra note 17, at 1465–67. 
362 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.2, at 110–18. 
363 See Whitehead, supra note 359, at 5–7; Sung Eun (Summer) Kim, 
Managing Regulatory Blindspots: A Case Study of Leveraged Loans, 32 
YALE J. ON REG. 89, 92 (2015). This, after all, is the source of the term 
“shadow banking.” See Laura E. Kodres, What Is Shadow Banking?, FIN. 
& DEV., June 2013, at 42, 42 (citing Paul McCulley, Remarks at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Economic Symposium (Sept. 5, 
2007)). 
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plodding through a rigorous market definition/market share 
analysis for derivatives and their substitutes, regulators may 
be able to chase down the market-makers for new products 
and at least arrest the velocity with which unregulated 
markets expand.364 This more nimble, functional approach 
can help regulators overcome their institutional 
predispositions to detect the trends linking disparate 
products and players.365 
VI. CONCLUSION 
One glaring deficiency of the traditional, “first-
generation” approach toward monopolization is its insistence 
on anticompetitive conduct by a single firm. The inability of 
antitrust to recognize a “second generation” of 
monopolization harms from parallel exclusion consigns the 
OTC derivatives markets to a degree of concentration that 
imperils competition, consumers, and control over systemic 
risk. 
The dominant derivatives dealers wield the market power 
to harm competition. Today, these dealers drive the 
standard-setting processes of derivatives clearinghouses, 
natural monopolies in the upstream market. Large dealers 
can independently decide to adopt risk guidelines that 
prevent their rivals from joining clearinghouses—which, due 
to the indispensability of the clearing function to trading, 
raises the rivals’ costs. This is but the latest in a pattern of 
recidivist exclusion characterizing the dealer oligopoly. In 
the past, large dealers have resisted market and regulatory 
transformations by colluding to stifle innovations in both 
clearing and trading. 
Market power in the clearing and trading markets is 
made manifest by a rigorous application of the traditional 
 
364 More research must be done to flesh out how this might unfold. 
365 See Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, Design of Financial Systems: 
Towards a Synthesis of Function and Structure, J. INV. MGMT. First 
Quarter 2015, at 6, 20–21. 
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market definition/market share paradigm. For all its 
infirmities, this paradigm is useful as a way of illuminating 
blind spots in financial regulation. Of course, this blending of 
antitrust principles and financial regulation must contend 
with larger questions on institutional design and the goals of 
antitrust. This Article anticipates that addressing those 
issues can help slow the speeds at which financial complexity 
outpaces regulation. 
 
